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R.G. 910 Report of Investigation of 822nd TK 134
(Shed G-3 64E.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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By NND 760219	NARS, Date 9/15/94

DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

827TH TD BN

Conducted by:

N. L. ADAMS,
Colonel, I.G.D.,
Inspector General.

Encl #2

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I N D E X

WITNESSES

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I N D E X

EXHIBITS

Efficiency Ratings of Officers and AGCT

Ratings of Enlisted Men of 827th TD Bn. EXHIBIT "B"

Materiel Assigned to the 827th TD Bn and

Commanding Officers and Approximate Dates of Command. EXHIBIT "C"

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Lt. Col. PHILLIP J. VANDER ZWIEP, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at the 827th TD Bn. Headquarters, Biblisheim, France, on 16 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number and organization.

A. Phillip J. Vander Zwiep, Lieutenant Colonel, 0287932, FA, Commanding Officer, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The rights of a witness under the provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood them.

1. Q. What is your duty?

A. Commanding Officer, 827th TD Battalion.

2. Q. How long have you been commanding officer of this battalion?

A. Since 5 August 1944.

3. Q. How long have you been on active duty?

A. Since 1 December 1940.

4. Q. What assignments have you had since 1 December 1940?

A. I was a battery officer, Field Artillery and a battery commander, Field Artillery. I went to Fort Sill and came back as a battery officer. I was in this capacity from 1 December 1940 until 4 March 1941. I was made battery commander in September 1941 and continued until August 1942. I was S-2 of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center for two months, until November 1942. I was a tank destroyer battalion executive until January 1943, then commandant of Officers' Post Graduate School from January 1943 until January 1944, then I was a student of the Command and General Staff School from January until April 1944, then a student at Field Artillery School from April until July 1944.

5. Q. State briefly, please, your estimation of the training of this battalion since you have taken it over.

A. Upon assumption of command, 5 August 1944, I found the battalion disorganized and learned that it had failed five Army Ground Force battalion tests. Training was immediately instituted to protect the battalion by firing and tactical maneuvering, special attention was given to reconnaissance in view of the fact that the reconnaissance company was found to be very inefficient. Three

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VANDER ZWIEP

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weeks were spent in field problems and two command post exercises were undertaken inasmuch as the staff had never taken such exercises. Army Ground Force tests were held approximately three weeks later, the tactical problems being run over the same course on which the battalion had previously trained. The firing tests were undertaken on the same moving target range on which the previous tests had been made and on which we had opportunity to fire practice fire for three weeks. The reconnaissance company was given special field problems on reconnaissance work and its special examination was held over terrain which the company had practiced for three weeks. The firing tests were taken satisfactorily. The shooting of the 76mm gun was to my satisfaction as well as the rest of the officers in the battalion. The battalion tactical test was undertaken and a satisfactory rating was given by the examining team of XXIII Corps. This team was composed of officers from the 24th Tank Destroyer Group. The tactical test was not completed satisfactorily according to my belief. Radio procedure during the tests was very poor. Discipline of the troops in bivouac and on the march was not indicative of trained troops. The reconnaissance company tests were passed as satisfactory, although the reconnaissance company commander did not think the troops were capable of undertaking any reconnaissance work. I was informed that the reconnaissance company had been organized and reorganized over a period of months due to the fact that the battalion was a towed TD battalion, then a self-propelled TD battalion, then again a towed TD battalion, and finally as it is in its present organization, a self-propelled TD battalion. This difference in organization was caused by the changing of the T/O, which required the discontinuance of the reconnaissance company when the battalion operated as a towed unit and necessitated its reorganization when the unit was transferred from towed to self-propelled. I was informed by the commanding officers of headquarters and reconnaissance companies that they had been thus shunted around until it was organized in its present form. Upon completion of the tests I received notice that the battalion was satisfactory although I had received notice from XXIII Corps three weeks prior and previous to my assumption of command, that the battalion was generally unsatisfactory, as rated by inspectors from Fourth Army. I was notified that the battalion would be moved overseas on or about 1 October 1944. Preparations were made for the packing of materiel and equipment, and the drawing of necessary equipment which had either been lost or rendered combat unserviceable. The month of September 1944 was spent in preparing for overseas movement and the correction of records. Service Records were found to be incorrect. Enlisted men's Qualification Cards (WD AGO Form 20) had not been kept up to date. No records had been kept of the training the enlisted men had undertaken for a period of two and one half years. The battalion records were inspected on or about


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VANDER ZWIEP

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1 October 1944 by the Inspector General of the Fourth Army, and were found to be generally unsatisfactory. Corrections indicated by the Inspector General were undertaken and completed satisfactorily. During the month of September 1944, two general courts-martial cases resulted from the murder of a mess sergeant and the shooting of an enlisted man of the battalion. Time was lost from training and preparation for overseas movement in the preparation of the cases for trial, in view of the number of the battalion members involved. The battalion left Camp Hood, Texas for overseas in October and arrived at Camp Shanks Staging Area on about 25 October. The battalion sailed for France on 3 November 1944 and arrives in Marseilles on 13 November 1944. The battalion was in bivouac in the Delta Base Section Staging Area for approximately one month after its arrival in France, and during this time received its materiel and equipment which had been shipped by separate convoy. Lack of care of equipment was indicated here as was indicated at Camp Hood. The vehicles as they were driven from the dock to the staging area were involved in several accidents. Equipment was discarded by the men and it was necessary to make daily inspections and checks to prevent the loss of various items. The battalion was ordered to move to the Seventh Army area and bivouac in Sarrebourg, France, arriving in Sarrebourg on or about 16 December 1944. The approximately 500 mile motor march from Marseilles to Sarrebourg was under taken in five days. During the march, lack of march discipline was evidenced by numerous accidents, failure to observe instructions concerning speed limits, leaving the column by different vehicles and doubling the column by individual vehicles. The troops were extremely slow in moving into and out of bivouac areas. Numerous accidents occurred during the march. Vehicles were not properly lubricated either, as my attention was given to 1st and 2d echelon maintenance of the vehicles most of which were new. The vehicles were repaired in Sarrebourg. The battalion was ordered to move to the 12th Armored Division area on about 20 December 1944, and moved under orders from the 12th Armored Division to Bining, France. Company "B" of the battalion moved to a position in the line on 21 December. The company was at the front for approximately three days, during which time no ammunition was expended by the company. It was necessary to constantly supervise the troops in the destroyers to keep them from leaving the destroyers and lighting fires in view of the enemy. The company was in support of the 714th Tank Battalion and the tank battalion commander brought my attention to the fact that my men were leaving their vehicles and showed little discipline. We then withdrew from the line and moved to the town of Nebing, where we remained in bivouac for approximately nine days. The battalion next received orders to move to the vicinity of Hochfelden and was attached to Combat Command "B" of the 12th Armored Division.


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VANDER ZWIEP



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9 q. How long has your battalion trained on the M-18 tank destroyer?

A. They received the M-18 in May 1944 and I know they never fired the 76mm gun mounted on the destroyer prior to July 1944.

10 q. What steps have you taken to correct the poor road discipline to which you previously referred?

A. At Camp Hood during August 1944, two night marches and one daylight march was under taken by the battalion as a unit. Deficiencies noted and critiques held at the time were followed by marching the various companies under complete control of one group. I believe each company was able to under take two march training periods of approximately on half a day each.

11 q. What steps were taken to correct the falling out and doubling of the columns from Marseilles to Sarrebourg?

A. I placed my executive officer in the lead vehicle as convoy commander and with the aid of my motor officer and company commanders the convoy was constantly policed during the entire march. Deficiencies noted were corrected when found. Upon arrival in the town of Baccarat the entire battalion was assembled and warned of its poor discipline and NCOs were instructed to constantly watch their particular details which marching. I recall three NCOs being reduced in grade for failure to observe speed limits and proper road distances.

12 q. Were any improvements noted after the above corrective measures were taken?

A. Some improvement was noted.

13 q. What steps were taken to correct the lack of 1st and 2d echelon maintenance?

A. First and 2d echelon maintenance were called to the attention of the company commanders during the daily evening conferences. Close supervision of 1st and 2d echelon maintenance was by company officers also it was supervised by members of the staff and myself.

14 q. What shortage of officers exists in this battalion?

A. I have 27 officers and 2 warrant officers on duty and my T/O allows me 35 officers and 2 warrant officers. My officer shortage has been requisitioned.


15 q. In general, how do you rate your five company commanders?

A. Headquarters Company is very satisfactory. "A" Company is

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The town of Bossenforf, approximately three kilometers from Hochfelden, was assigned as the battalion bivouac area on 6 January 1945, and we remained in bivouac until 2400 hours 6 January 1945. Verbal orders were received to proceed to the vicinity of Surbaurg and join the 79th Division, Task Force WAHL. At approximately 1830 hours, 6 January, Lt. Rosenbaum, commanding the reconnaissance company, was shot by an enlisted man, a member of "A" Company. An investigation of the incident has been under taken. The essence of the testimony to date, is to the effect that Lt. Rosenbaum attempted to quell a disturbance in one of the several houses, and upon entering the house was fired on twice by Pvt. Brown of "A" Company, using his carbine. Lt. Rosenbaum was struck in the shoulder by a bullet and returned fire with his pistol, striking Pvt. Brown. Both officer and man were evacuated after receiving aid from the battalion surgeon. At 2330 hours, 6 January, Capt. Mayo, commanding "A" Company, reported to me that he was unable to move his company because approximately 75 percent of them were missing and others in the bivouac area were under the influence of liquor. Orders had been received and it had been planned to commit "A" Company upon arrival in the Surbourg area. Capt. Mayo's report necessitated a change in the organizational plan of commitment and so "C" Company was designated to take the front line position first.

- 6q. Returning to your discussion of your MTP tests prior to your leaving the United States, you said radio procedure was very poor, please explain in what way the radio procedure was poor?
- A. The radio operators were unable to operate the the various battalion nets effectively. Communication was not in effect during at least 50 percent of the tactical problems because of inability of the operators to recall the various call signs.
- 7q. What has been done since that time to correct this radio communication?
- A. Immediately after the battalion tests were completed a school for radio operators was held in the battalion area and the communications officer was relieved and replaced by the present officer, Lt. Fink. Due to the packing period which followed the tests little time was available for the use of radio because they were being packed and marked for shipment.
- 8q. Can your battalion operate radios efficiently today?
- A. They can not because of inability to under take new call signs and assimilate SOIs with which they are almost daily confronted. There are only five CW operators in the battalion at the present time.


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VANDER ZWIEP



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superior. "B" Company is very satisfactory. "C" Company is excellent. Reconnaissance Company is excellent.

16 q. Have you had any disciplinary problems with the officers in this battalion?

A. Only an occasional administrative reprimand because of failure to accomplish some matters with dispatch.

17 q. Do you feel that the officers in this battalion are average, above average or below average?

A. Average, in general.

18 q. What is your understanding as to the most efficient method of handling tank destroyers? Keeping them under your direct control? Or, attaching them to other organizations?

A. Keeping them under my direct control.

19 q. Have you or have you not an effective communications net when you handle the tank destroyers under your direct control?

A. No, Sir.

20 q. Then should your tank destroyers be under your control or supporting other units and attached to other units?

A. This particular unit can best operate in small units of approximately platoon strength due to inability to communicate by radio.

21 q. How is this battalion operating at present?

A. The battalion is at present is employed by platoons.

22 q. To whom then will the platoon commanders look for target assignments?

A. the commander of the unit which he is supporting.

23 q. Have you received complete cooperation from the infantry units to which your platoons have been attached?


A. No. Our "A" Company commanders have never been consulted concerning movement of destroyers or the accomplishment of destroyer missions. The "B" Company commander complained to me a few days ago that he was not getting the support from the infantry. They were using him as an assault gun. In one case "B" Company commander was ordered by the infantry commander to under take a

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VANDER ZWIEP



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certain mission which according to a tank commander could not be accomplished by tanks. The infantry commander ordered the Company "B" commander to under take the mission.

24q. Have you ever served with colored troops prior to this assignment?

A. No, Sir.

25q. Where were you born and raised?

A. San Francisco, California.

26q. Can you give an average general efficiency rating of the NCOs in your battalion?

A. Yes, Sir, unsatisfactory. They are unable to control the men, and have now more knowledge of the work to be done than the average private in the organization.

27q. In general do you think that you have the best men in your battalion as NCOs?

A. Yes, Sir.

28q. Have you anything else to say at this time?


A. No, Sir, I have nothing further to say at this time.

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VANDER ZWIEP



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LT COLONEL PHILLIP J. VANDER ZWIEP, FA, Commanding Officer, 827th TD Battalion, was recalled before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at Hq 827th TD Battalion, on 18 January 1945, reminded that he was still under oath and of his rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30.

29 Q. As Battalion Commander have you had the opportunity to select your destroyer positions that are now occupied?

A. No Sir.

30 Q. Who has selected those positions for your destroyers?

A. Major McCutchen, 813th TD Battalion, has selected the positions.

31 Q. To whom do you look for orders in this Battalion?

A. TF Wahl, Commanding General. In company with Colonel Bromley I reported to General Wysche, 79th Division, who informed me that I would perform under General Wahl. So far this Battalion has not received any order or instructions relieving it from attached to the 12th Armored Division, although I understand that this Battalion is working under TF Wahl and I have been informed that this Battalion is attached to the 813th TD Battalion for operations.

32 Q. To which organization do you look for supplies and administration?

A. I look to the 12th Armored Division for administration and the Seventh Army for supplies.


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VANDER ZWIEP



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Major CARL A. FRASER, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at the 827th TD Bn Headquarters at Biblisheim, France, on 16 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number and organization.

A. Carl A. Fraser, Major, 0230548, FA, Executive Officer, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The rights of a witness under the provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood them.

33 Q. What are your duties?

A. I am executive officer of the 827th TD Battalion.

34 Q. How long have you been executive officer?

A. Since about 17 December 1944.

35 Q. How long have you been with the battalion?

A. Since 2 September 1944.

36 Q. What was your assignment before that?

A. Upon reporting for active duty in June 1942, as I was a reserve officer, I took a Field Artillery refresher course of one month and since that time I have been on continuous duty with colored tank destroyer battalions, except for three months at tank destroyer school and ten weeks at Command and General Staff School.

37 Q. Briefly, please, what is your reaction to colored troops assigned to tank destroyer work?

A. My personal opinion is that they are totally incapable of absorbing the training and tactics along mechanical lines which are necessary for successful operation of a tank destroyer battalion.

38 Q. When you joined this battalion was it sufficiently efficient to receive a satisfactory rating on subjects covered by the several MTP tests?

A. In my opinion, no, Sir.

39 Q. In general how do you rate the officers in this battalion as compared to other officers with the same length of service?

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FRASER

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
- A. As far as ability goes, they are equivalent to the other battalions I have been in.
40. Q. How do you consider the radio work of this battalion?
- A. I have seen very little of it in operation and have not seen them operate the radios. Some messages brought to me at Nebing were badly garbled due to the inefficiency of the battalion operators.
41. Q. How do you consider this battalion in regard to convoy ability?
- A. Poor, they are not on the whole proficient drivers. Their convoy discipline is bad. They exceed maximum speed limits, they are all over the road and do not take care going through towns.
42. Q. How do you rate this battalion with other battalions you have been with?
- A. It is the least prepared for combat and has the poorest disciplinary training of any of the four that I have been with.
43. Q. How do you rate the NCOs of this battalion with the other colored battalions you have served with?
- A. I would say below the average, because of lack of discipline, unreliability and independability.
44. Q. Why do you feel that the NCOs will not accept responsibility?
- A. I don't know, either they have to be made to accept it and there are limits to their abilities or that the officers have given up hope that they can do the duties of an NCO.
45. Q. Have you anything else to say at this time?
- A. When I first joined the 827th TD Battalion I didn't have this prejudice against the colored troops. Ninety percent of this prejudice and feeling I have toward these colored troops has resulted from my experience with four colored battalions.
46. Q. Where were you raised?
- A. In Massachusetts, Sir.
47. Q. Have you anything else to add?
- A. I have seen the status of training file maintained by the S-3 in which are the reports of the various proficiency tests for

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FRASER



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the period of six to nine months preceeding the embarkation from the United States and to the best of my knowledge there has been no report of a test given to this battalion which was rated satisfactory. It is my opinion that this outfit was railroaded through the test.

48 Q. Have you anything else to add at this time?

A. No, Sir.

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FRASER

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MAJOR GEORGE W. HARTUNG, FA, Headquarters 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at Hq 827th TD Battalion, on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. George W. Hartung, Major, O-370937, Headquarters, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood.

49 Q. What are your duties in this Battalion?

A. I am assigned as Battalion S-3.

50 Q. How long have you been Battalion S-3?

A. In two periods, during 1943 and since 9 January 1945.

51 Q. How long have you been with the 827th TD Battalion?

A. Since 13 September 1943.

52 Q. To your knowledge or from records, how many times was this battalion given the MTP tests prior to passing them?

A. From the records on file, this battalion was given the following tests: 1. MTP or AUTC test date 28 September 1943, results unsatisfactory. One comment on this test is quoted, "The personnel do not have a knowledge of the basic fundamentals and the NCO's failed to understand their responsibility and were not familiar with their duties"; 2. MTP re-test dated 2 October 43, rated unsatisfactory, with the same remarks as given above; 3. AGCT scores taken from WD, AGO Form No. 20 on 2 Oct 43 are as follows: Grade I - 0.15%, Grade II - 4.87%, Grade III - 12.4%, Grade IV - 44.43%, Grade V - 38.15%. Colonel Heavey, Unit Training Center, TD Center, Camp Hood, Texas, recommended an additional basic training period which, if it was not feasible, that consideration be given to redesignate the Battalion as other than a TD Battalion. 4. This Battalion participated under XV Corps in C.A.M.A. from 22 Nov 43 to 11 Dec 43 and was given a general rating of unsatisfactory in the following: movement, occupation of firing position, commands and control, reconnaissance, communications, and motor maintenance. The Battalion was given a rating of satisfactory in the following: security and supply, and excellent for the battalion command and staff. One comment in reporting on this movement is quoted, "Reasons for unsatisfactory ratings above were entirely due to the lack of leadership, knowledge, and ability of the junior officers. In my opinion, the majority of these officers could not be rated as satisfactory". This


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HARTUNG



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report was signed by Colonel J. J. Deery, Commanding the 12th TD Group; 5. MTP retest dated 14 July 1944, final rating satisfactory; 6. Physical Fitness test dated 13 July 1944, rating unsatisfactory. This Battalion received a score of zero on the short-fast march; 7. Basic Medical Subject test given 20 July 1944 at Camp Hood, Texas, with general rating of satisfactory with qualifications; 8. Combat Firing and Tactical Proficiency test, 17 - 21 July 1944, with final rating of unsatisfactory; 9. Physical Fitness retest, 8 August 1944, with rating of satisfactory; 10. Headquarters Fourth Army waved indirect fire training for the 827th TD Battalion under date of 24 August 1944; 11. Combat Firing and Tactical Proficiency retest, 4 September 1944, with tactical proficiency test score of 70.5% and final rating of satisfactory. Major Doty was in charge of actual retest under supervision of 24th TD Group and XXIII Corps. It is my belief that this Battalion did not pass with a sufficient score to receive a general rating of satisfactory.

53

Q. Have you personally seen other TD Battalions tested?

A. Yes Sir, based on the following experience: I was assigned as an instructor in the Tactics Department of the TD School, Camp Hood, Texas in July 1942, until I was assigned to this Battalion in September 1943. I am also a graduate of the TD School and FA School. During this period as instructor of tactics, I participated almost daily in classes, various phases of TD tactics, and was often called in on the testing of TD battalions at Camp Hood, Texas.

54

Q. Can you give specific instances that occurred during the test of 4 Sept 44 that support your statement, "It is my belief that this Battalion did not pass with a sufficient score to receive a general rating of satisfactory"?

A. In phase II of the Reconnaissance Platoon Action our Battalion received a score of 17.6% out of a possible score of 21%. The umpires comments on reconnaissance of position are as follows: "The reconnaissance vehicles did not move by bounds over routes which offered the most cover. Personnel did not dismount from vehicles during reconnaissance". It is my opinion that the Battalion should not have been given a grade of 70.5%, because I personally stood in the forward OP with the officer conducting the test and watched one of our reconnaissance platoons drive down a road into a road block without either dispersing or seeking out the vague situation that he knew existed, and I watched them drive their vehicles into a reconstructed road block and explosives simulating land mines, explode against the vehicles. Another factor to be considered is that the test of 4 Sept 44 was conducted on exactly the same ground as the previous test, the enemy armored attack came from the same direction, and the fire fight occurred on the same general terrain.


58 537

EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 13 -

HARTUNG



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 Q. Did you observe the TD that burned on 14 January 1945?

A. Yes Sir, I saw the M-18 Destroyer, C-10, burning in a barn at the southeast corner of Oberroedern the afternoon of 14 January 1945. I made a report to my Battalion Commander on 14 January 1945. I will have a copy of this report made for you.

56 Q. What is your rating of this Battalion in regards to communications, road marches, and tactical employment?

A. Communications: The personnel of this Battalion have never been able to maintain what I would term a satisfactory radio net for any period of time, although every enlisted man assigned to a radio section in this Battalion is a graduate of some communications school, TD or otherwise, except the men in the destroyer crews who are not regular assigned radio operators but are sometimes assigned to a set. Road Marches: This Battalion can conduct a fairly satisfactory road march with wheeled vehicles. During these marches the personnel will not perform first-echelon maintenance unless they are absolutely forced to. Tactics: This Battalion has received the best training possible to give at the TD Center, have gone through unit training twice, have been school troops for over 6 months, and in addition to this have been at a desert training center, in and out of maneuvers for 5 months, and further training at Ft Huachuca, Arizona and Camp Hood, Texas. It is my opinion in combat that the personnel have retained little or none of their training experience, and very few of the gun commanders exhibit little or no tactical ability, and as soon as the enemy shells land near them they forget it all. I further feel that this Battalion should be converted other than a TD Battalion at the earliest possible time.

57 Q. Which company in this battalion do you consider the best?

A. Company A, although Companies B and C are good companies also.

58 Q. Have you had any favorable reports during the last day or so of any particular destroyer crew?

A. On 17 January 1945 S/Sgt Russell was in position south of Hatten working close coordination with antitank elements of the 242d Infantry. Yesterday afternoon Captain Mayo reported to me that Sgt Russell had knocked out 2 German Mark-4 tanks at an estimate range of 1400 yards. Capt Mayo returned after the fire and saw the results and the tanks burning. Sgt Russell further reported that he spent 7 rounds in firing.

59 Q. Have you anything else to state at this time?

A. No Sir.

58 538

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

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HARTUNG

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SK HAWA, Dab

Capt. LOUIS P. VINCENT, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at the 827th TD Bn. Headquarters, Biblisheim, France, on 16 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number and organization.

A. Louis P. Vincent, Captain, 01824103, FA, Motor Officer, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The rights of a witness under the provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood them.

60 Q. What are your duties?

A. Motor Officer, 827th TD Battalion.

61 Q. How long have you been motor officer of this battalion?

A. Since 5 May 1944.

62 Q. How do you rate your personnel as to efficiency?

A. They're not any where near as efficient as a white battalion. They can not do things in a big hurry and it requires time.

63 Q. In case you have an important job to do such as recovering a tank destroyer, have you an NCO you could sent out to do the job?

A. Yes I have men who will go up and recover vehicles if you give them plenty of time.

64 Q. Have you any instances where you have sent men out and accomplished important work?

A. No, Sir, I have not sent a man after a vehicle that I did not go along.

65 Q. Were you recently ordered to recover a tank destroyer?

A. Yes, Sir.

66 Q. Why Didn't you send one of your NCOs to recover that vehicle?

A. I didn't know just what the situation was and I didn't know if they could handle it or not.

58 539

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

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VINCENT

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By <u>SL</u> H/WA, Data

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- 67 Q. How are the colored drivers in regard to 1st and 2d echelon maintenance?
- A. They're no good. They just don't give a damn.
- 68 Q. What have you done to endeavor to correct this difficulty?
- A. We have had all of the officers supervise motor maintenance as far as possible. However it is harder to accomplish this here.
- 69 Q. Do you consider your vehicles in good condition at the present time?
- A. They're in fair condition, Sir.
- 70 Q. And the M-18 equipment?
- A. Sir, they're brand new. It was last 2 February we received new vehicles.
- 71 Q. What have you done within your battalion to improve the 1st and 2d echelon maintenance?
- A. We have put out memos stating what's to be checked each day, when the oil is to be checked, when the tires are to be checked, and this is to be done under the supervision of an officer at all times.
- 72 Q. Why not under the supervision of an NCO?
- A. It doesn't get the same results.
- 73 Q. Have you recently retrieved a tank destroyer?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- 74 Q. Explain briefly please, how that was done?
- A. The destroyer was on the forward slope of a hill with another destroyer in a cut 70 yards directly behind it. The first night we took a 2½-ton truck and went around the destroyer that was in position to get to the disabled one. We worked an hour and a half and had to give it up when the winch broke. The next night the same route was taken and the destroyer was recovered. That was on the night of 14 January.
- 75 Q. Who do you mean by, we?
- A. A warrant officer, master sergeant, our company motor sergeant, the driver of the recovery vehicle and myself.


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EXHIBIT "A"

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VINCENT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76 Q. Could your master sergeant and warrant officer have gotten that vehicle out?

A. Yes, Sir, they could have.

77 Q. What type of maintenance trouble do you have in the majority of cases?

A. Lately it has been from slipping on the ice, hitting buildings, backing into objects and breaking idler wheels, starter trouble, speeding and lack of 1st echelon maintenance on the M-20s and M-18s.

78 Q. Have you anything else to say at this time?

A. No, Sir.

88 541

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

- 17 -

VINCENT

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SB N/A, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Capt. ADRIAN C. LAMOS, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at the 827th TD Bn. Headquarters at Biblisheim, France, on 16 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Adrian C. Lamos, Captain, 0492016, MC, Battalion Surgeon, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood them.

79 Q. What are your duties?

A. Battalion Surgeon, 827th TD Battalion.

80 Q. How long have you been battalion surgeon?

A. I have been with the battalion since May 1943.

81 Q. What technical school are you graduated from?

A. Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tennessee.

82 Q. What is the reaction of the enlisted men of this battalion to tank destroyer work?

A. To the best of my knowledge I would say that they seem to be quite satisfied with the work. You hear an occasional gripe now and then.

83 Q. Do you have a very heavy sick call?

A. No, Sir, in comparison to other battalions. The reason is that I have started the method of processing the men and when a man becomes a habitual visitor on sick call, I give him an examination for hospital consultation and upon receiving the report which was usually negative I would talk to the individual.

84 Q. Have you anything else to say at this time?

A. Nothing, Sir.


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EXHIBIT "A"

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LAMOS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1ST LT ROBERT D FINK, Headquarters Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at Hq 827th TD Battalion, on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Robert D. Fink, 1st Lt, O-1170363, Hq Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood.

85 Q. What are your duties?

A. Communications Officer of the 827th TD Battalion.

86 Q. How long have you been Communications Officer?

A. Since about 1 October 1944.

87 Q. Were you ever Communications Officer in a TD battalion prior to 1 October 1944?

A. I was Communications Officer for 6 months with the 646th TD Battalion, approximately 4 months with the 669th TD Battalion, and approximately 2 weeks with the 679th TD Battalion.

88 Q. Has your communications service been with white or colored troops?

A. It has been with colored troops, except for one month in a replacement pool at Camp Hood, Texas.

89 Q. How do you compare the communications of the 827th TD Battalion with the other 3 colored TD Battalions that you served with as communications officer?

A. The communications section of the 827th TD Battalion is in my opinion equal to the communications sections of the other TD Battalions.

90 Q. Can your communications section as now constituted, operate under radio net?

A. I have personnel who can operate efficiently on the battalion net, but not on the respective company nets.


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FINK



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91 Q. Why are they unable to operate on the company nets?

A. The men operating the radios in each tank destroyer have not been properly trained to the end that they can operate on the company net. It is my belief that the men who are supposed to operate the radios in the tank destroyers, in the majority of cases, are not capable of being trained due to low AGCT scores. All the men have been given training in radio procedure and I doubt very much if my best trained radio men in the battalion will be able to operate efficiently a radio under direct shell fire.

92 Q. With additional training and additional experience at the front, do you feel they will be able to operate their radios successfully?

A. No Sir, because of instances like this: 1. A man did not want to turn on a radio in a destroyer because he felt it would direct enemy fire; 2. I feel that the radio work under strain of battle is too much for the men in the tank destroyers; and 3. A battery was too low in a destroyer to operate a radio and I told the radio operator to connect his battery pack to his radio, but he did not know how to do it and he also did not know how to insert dry-cell batteries in the battery pack.

93 Q. Assume you withdraw from the front. How long would it take to have an efficient radio team to operate the battalion and company nets?

A. A month of intensive study, nothing interfering such as duties and details, would be sufficient time to train enough men in order that this battalion could have a battalion command net and company nets.

94 Q. At the end of this month of intensive training you return to the front; do you feel that you would continue to have an efficient radio procedure in this battalion?

A. I feel that the procedure would not be efficient because of the excitement and fear due to battle conditions, but it would be satisfactory enough to have communications between platoon leaders and company commanders which in many cases we are not having now.

95 Q. Have you received cooperation in this battalion in your communication's work?

A. As much cooperation as I could get from anyone, both company commanders and platoon commanders.

96 Q. Do you feel that the battalion and company commanders realize the importance of communications?

A. Since joining this battalion, they were impressed with the importance of communications.


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FINK



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97 Q. Has the importance of communications been stressed with the EM of this battalion?

A. Since joining this battalion, it has been stressed.

98 Q. Can the personnel of your battalion section change their call signs as required by Seventh Army and operate efficiently?

A. Yes Sir.

58 545

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

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FINK

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730027
Authority
By <u>SL</u> HNV, Dab

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Statement of Colonel HERSCHEL D. BAKER, 011391, FA, Executive Officer,
33d Field Artillery Brigade.

99 I took command of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion approximately 24 May 1943, and remained in command until 21 February 1944. I had previously served with the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion with the 1st Infantry Division in combat in North Africa during the Tunisian Campaign. I had been asked for by the Tank Destroyer School, Camp Hood, Texas, and returned to the United States to that assignment. Approximately one month after I was assigned to the tank destroyer school, I was given command of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion and was told to straighten it out.

100 At the time I took command of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion in August 1943, they were on an alert to go overseas in October 1943. I was completely amazed at how poorly trained they were and in my estimation it was a battalion in name only. The battalion had previously failed all the tests they were required to pass by Army Ground Force, but were marked by the Training Center at Camp Hood as having passed their basic training courses. After investigation I determined to my own satisfaction that the battalion should never have been passed on their own basic tests. The battalion had been used as school troops for some time and that apparently had something to do with the satisfactory rating given in basic training subjects.

101 At the time I took the battalion they were scheduled to take several advanced tests. I had little occasion to practice for these tests. One of the tests was direct fire on moving targets and required sixty percent hits for a passing grade. The gun companies of the battalion averaged fourteen percent hits. The firing was from self-propelled M-10 tank destroyers. By giving the officers and non-commissioned officers gun drill in the evening after supper and at regular training periods we managed to pass the direct fire test, making a grade for the battalion of approximately sixty-five and eight tenths percent. Although some platoons made as little as forty percent, on approximately 15 September 1943 the battalion also passed a tactical flank guard action test given by the Advanced Unit Training Center, but failed two other tests. One a battalion tactical problem and the other to test companies in occupation of positions and firing.


102 Approximately five days after I had taken command I decided it would be a crime to take this unit against an armed enemy in October. To me the battalion was unsatisfactory in all forms of training, both basic and advanced. I therefore wrote a letter of approximately five pages which I personally delivered to Major General Orlando Ward, Commanding General of the Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood, Texas. At this time there were exactly eleven white officers and approximately thirty-five colored officers in the battalion. At least eighty percent of the colored officers should never have been commissioned. Most of the white officers were inexperienced having been commissioned from OCS with promotions made of one to two grades

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- 22 -

BAKER



in a year. The Executive Officer, a white major, was commanding the battalion when I assumed command. He was entirely unsatisfactory and I had him reclassified after taking command.

103

Although the secondary mission of my tank destroyer battalion was to be able to fire indirect fire, this battalion had never received any training in indirect fire methods, with the exception of one young captain who had graduated from an OCS course at the field artillery school, but had never served with a field artillery unit, and myself. There were no officers or enlisted men in the battalion who had served in the field artillery consequently we could not instruct properly on indirect fire methods.

104

The T/O enlisted strength was 636 enlisted men. A few days after assuming command I made a check and found 560 enlisted men of the battalion were either class IV or V under the Army Personnel Classification Tests. The battalion was originally equiped with M-3 (half-track) destroyers and then was changed to a 3" towed gun battalion. As nearly as I could determine they had been redesignated a self-propelled M-10 unit about 25 July 1943. The battalion was only partly equiped with M-10s, all of which had been used in training by many other battalions. These tank destroyers were not in a desireable condition. Many major assemblies were worn out and many parts were missing. The battalion S-4 claimed that the tracked vehicles as well as many of the wheeled vehicles had been received in that condition.

105

All records in the battalion were not in a satisfactory condition and I could not determine a status of the vehicles when the unit received them. The reconnaissance company had been reactivated when the battalion was changed to self-propelled M-10s and had approximately sixty percent of the major items of equipment. There were no records to show what equipment had been issued to this company. There was not an officer in the company who had signed for any company property. It was impossible to find an enlisted man in the battalion who could write a satisfactory letter or keep any record properly. The personnel adjutant was a colored warrant officer whose performance of duty was entirely unsatisfactory.

106


There was considerable race feeling in the battalion when I took command. I had good information that colored officers were holding meetings with enlisted men in latrines and other places at night. The purpose of these meetings was to get rid of the white officers, which would in turn give colored officers a chance to become company commanders and staff officers. The battalion commander, executive officer, S-1, 2, 3, and 4 and five company commanders were white officers. The discipline in the battalion was extremely poor. The unit guard as posted each day was unsatisfactory. Enlisted men would come in at all hours of the night intoxicated and create considerable disturbance. I stopped this in three days by getting the company commanders out of bed and having them establish a proper guard. Small arms were generally in poor condition. Officers and men were short many items of individual clothing and equipment. The balance of the individual clothing and equipment was in a disreputable condition.

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BAKER



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I included the above in the letter to General Ward. I requested that General Ward explain to Army Ground Force the conditions existing in the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion and asked that the alert date be set back from November 1943. I strongly protested this alert date, for I felt sure the battalion could not meet the POM requirements in less than six months, if ever. I recommended that Col. Heavy who commanded the Advanced Unit Training Center at Camp Hood, Texas, and whose headquarters was giving this battalion their tests at the time I assumed command, that the battalion was in no way qualified and that it should begin training all over again even though it had passed its direct fire test better than some of the battalions in the training center, it was my opinion that the test was too easy. I clearly stated to Col. Heavy and Gen. Ward that in my opinion the most essential elements in training a tank destroyer battalion was their fire power, both direct and indirect combined with movement, reconnaissance, security and communications. To me the battalion was unsatisfactory in all these elements except in direct fire. It made Camp Hood standards but the gun crews were slow and many gunners would do well for a day or two and then seem to forget how to properly lay a piece.

107

On 2 October this battalion was sent to the California-Arizona maneuver area. All wheeled vehicles were turned in at Camp Hood. All M-10s approximately three or four other special vehicles were shipped to the desert. I had put all the M-10s through ordnance prior to leaving Camp Hood. Due to a shortage of tracks and other parts the ordnance was unable to put the worn out M-10s in anywhere near a satisfactory condition. Thus we arrived on the desert and it took over a month to equip the battalion with wheeled vehicles and other major items of equipment. The wheeled vehicles that were issued were no more than junk. At least 23 motors as well as many other major parts of the vehicles had to be repaired again ten days after issue. Some of the vehicles had to be towed into my camp when they were given to us. My battalion was attached to the 93d (Colored) Infantry Division. Very few parts for tracked or wheeled vehicles were available on the desert due to the manner in which the equipment was issued and it was impossible to have much training other than dismounted. On about 6 November the battalion was ordered on a six week's maneuver with the 93d Infantry Division. I stated to the division commander at the time that I was not properly trained or equipped to take part in the maneuver, but I would like to take the battalion for the experience they would get being in the field with an infantry division. The battalion had never been on or had taken part in any large field exercise.

108

Officers who had been with the battalion since activation claimed that prior to the time I assumed command the battalion had taken only two or three road marches and one battalion field exercise and on these they were rated unsatisfactory.

109


In comparison with colored units of the 93d Infantry Division the battalion was above average in my opinion. Before the maneuver was completed we had to be withdrawn due to maintenance troubles. The battalion

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EXHIBIT "A"

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BAKER



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

entered the maneuver with vehicles in extremely poor condition and they required another period for a complete overhaul.

110

I organized officer schools and non-commissioned officer schools in order that they might be instructed on fairly ordinary matters. Officers were required to attend school from 3:30 pm until 5:00 pm and then again attend at night from 7:00 until 9:00 o'clock. On completion of these schools simple tests were given. I found the white officers would make a score of between 90 percent and 100 percent in every test given. Very few of the colored officers ever made a passing score. The grades ranged from 0 percent to approximately 60 percent, the average being about 40 percent. I found many colored officers to be unreliable and inefficient. Many would lie to me but in a manner that I was unable to prove that they had made false statements. Soon after taking command of the battalion I decided it would be necessary to reclassify many of the officers. I did this as rapidly as possible. It was difficult to accumulate enough data where so many officers were concerned. I made every effort to secure high grade white officers and did receive a total of fifteen who were trained in field artillery. They were all second lieutenants. I also received about ten white officers who had been trained at the tank destroyer center at Camp Hood, Texas. These officers trained in the tank destroyers were supposed to be especially selected but I found them to be below average. During the time I commanded the battalion either through reclassification or transfer (due to overstrength in officers) I got rid of 39 officers and one warrant officer. The total T/O strength was 38 officers and one warrant officer for the battalion. In my opinion the officers who were reclassified or transferred were inefficiently trained or had proved themselves so inefficient that I considered them all incapable of performing duty during battle. I did not have time to change all these officers but did reclassify the most inefficient ones. With the exception of the battalion executive all reclassifications were of colored officers. All the colored officers who were reclassified had their commissions terminated. During January and part of February 1944 I had all types of training in an attempt to meet POM requirements. I particularly stressed training to qualify for a mission of indirect fire. With the aid of the young field artillery officers the battalion had three days of indirect fire which in my opinion was satisfactory. However, this was not a test. In February on several occasions I recommended to higher commanders and one inspector of Camp Hood that the battalion be changed to a quartermaster truck battalion or a labor battalion. My reason for making this recommendation was that as time went on and the battalion had all but seven white officers and I considered all my officers white and colored satisfactory, I became more and more certain that it was impossible with the present enlisted personnel to ever attain satisfactory battle standards in all phases of training necessary for combat. I found the majority of the enlisted men entirely willing to work and very easy to discipline, in this respect they were better than the colored officers. I replaced at least 150 enlisted men through one means or another in order to secure a higher AGCT type and on the whole bettered the battalion. I still found that due to the large number of technicians, radio operators, repair


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EXHIBIT "A"

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BAKER



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

men, mechanics, etc. that it was impossible to find sufficient enlisted men to fill NCO ratings allowed as technicians. My NCOs were unequal to the grades held. I found that the majority of NCOs tried hard and obeyed orders. Some of the cadre NCOs who came from the 9th and 10th Cavalry said that they would desert before they would go overseas under command of colored officers. A few NCOs stated to agents that I had working that they preferred all colored officers. I found the race problem easy to solve and in my opinion it existed mainly due to the colored officers who actually received support from the enlisted men. I finally broke up the secret meetings by announcing that whoever called a meeting of enlisted men without my approval would be tried by a general courts-martial.

111 During the period the battalion was under my command on the desert no tests were given by higher headquarters to determine the battalions status for overseas movement. However, the battalion was alerted and ordered to proceed to San Francisco on 15 February 1944. The order was cancelled 24 hours before the advanced detachment was to depart. The necessary packing and unpacking of the organization's equipment handicapped training for a considerable period. During the maneuvers in November and December the battalion operated against tanks of the opposing forces. I found that colored officers and NCOs would become so excited they would jam the radio channels with excited chatter. This one point made me wonder that if enemy tanks appeared before the battalion just what would happen. I commanded a tank destroyer battalion in North Africa during the Tunisian Campaign which destroyed more enemy tanks than any other in Tunisia. I can say here that fighting tanks is often a very quick action where a fraction of a second of opportunity on the part of the gun crew may determine whether you or the enemy is knocked out. I found that colored troops were slow and that they fail to obtain the speed and accuracy for tank destroyer combat. Although I constantly tried to build up this battalion I had no confidence in the unit and would not have liked to have gone into combat with them. I am sure many of the colored officers and all of the white officers felt so at the time.

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BAKER

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SK NAWA, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAJOR GEORGE McCUTCHEN, 813th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at Hq 827th TD Battalion, on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. George McCutchen, Major, O-366807, 813th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood.

112 Q. What are your present duties?

A. Commanding Officer of the 813th TD Battalion.

113 Q. Under what organization does the 813th TD Battalion operate?

A. This Battalion is attached to the 79th Division.

114 Q. From whom do you receive your orders at the present time?

A. I am working under TF Wahl at the present time.

115 Q. Do you have any official relationship with the 827th TD Battalion?

A. Having been on the ground and working with TF Wahl for some time, I was called to his CP when the 827th TD Battalion arrived in this area. Lt Colonel Vander Zwiap and I have been working together, coordinating our defenses in accordance with instructions of TF Wahl. At one time I was informed orally that the 827th TD Battalion was to be attached to my Battalion, but I have not received any additional orders.

116 Q. Do you, a member of your staff, or company commanders select your destroyer positions?


A. As a normal thing, the company commanders or his platoon leaders select their gun positions, but subject to approval of the regimental infantry commander.

58 551

EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

McCUTCHEN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2D LT ROBERT FRANKLIN JONES, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., at Hq 827th TD Battalion, on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Robert Franklin Jones, 2d Lt, O-523726, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood.

117 Q. What are your duties?

A. Platoon Commander in the Reconnaissance Company.

118 Q. How long have you been platoon commander?

A. Since 22 April 1944.

119 Q. How long have you been with this Battalion?

A. Since that time, Sir.

120 Q. Where is your home?

A. Casper, Wyoming.

121 Q. Have you ever served with colored units prior to joining this Battalion?

A. No Sir, I have not.

122 Q. What have you been doing the last week?

A. I have been platoon leader with a TD platoon in the town of Hatten.

123 Q. Explain briefly please what your duties were in Hatten?

A. The assignment was important because the company commander requested that 2 officers accompany the TD platoon into Hatten. The first day in the city the platoon leader was killed (Lt Brescia) so I assumed command of the platoon.

124 Q. Briefly outline your experience in the town of Hatten?

A. After Lt Brescia had been killed and I had assumed command, there were still 4 tank destroyers remaining in action, 2 of them had a mission of defending the west end of town, the remaining 2 were to be used as

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a road block to defend the eastern part of the position. The eastern position was more subject to attack, so I remained with that section of guns. In that position I had comprised a plan to enable us to move one TD forward where I could fire first at the enemy tank then withdraw under cover of the destroyer in the rear. The crew of the lead TD, upon hearing the tank approach, fired prematurely without command exposing their position and allowing the tank to return fire. The driver became excited and began to move the destroyer again without command. The TD moved back and in so doing received a direct hit on the front of the destroyer. It managed to back into a position of cover where the crew dismounted unarmed, leaving a loaded gun on the vehicle. I forced them to remount the vehicle only by direct order at the point of a gun. The injured destroyer was covered by the TD behind it manned by Sgt Johnson who remained at his position and fought the German tank off. This was not the only instance that the crew left their tank destroyer. The following afternoon the enemy tank again approached and at the sound of the tank the crew, commanded by Sgt Kendall, again deserted their tank destroyer. They were forced to return to their positions again by direct order at the point of a gun. The German tank was again fought off by Sgt Johnson, who remained on his TD and fired only at command and succeeded in knocking a track from the German tank. The first day after we had moved into position, the enemy tanks were sighted on the west side of town. The TD whose gunner was Sgt Irvin moved into a previously reconnoitered position and under fire command of Lt Brescia knocked out and burned 3 German tanks with 9 rounds at approximately 800 to 900 yards range.

125 Q. Did any one or more crews perform satisfactorily during the time you were in Hatten?

A. While in Hatten the crews of the gun sections on the west end of town remained in their position throughout the time I was in command, though in some cases it was with evident reluctance that they took the positions. The gun commanders in charge of these 2 guns placed their TD's in position as ordered, but even after receiving a direct order they attempted to argue against the advisability of placing the guns in the positions. On the other hand these same 2 gun crews retrieved their destroyers from the vicinity of a burning building while under a mortar barrage and moved them to new positions.

126 Q. What communications did you have with other organizations?


A. In the section at the east end of town a sound-power telephone was established from an OP ahead of the gun position directly to the gun. At the west end of town the only contact at the gun positions was by runner from the 2d Battalion, 315th Infantry, to the gun positions.

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JONES

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

127 Q. Did you operate radio within your company and battalion net?

A. No Sir, because either the batteries were low or because of mechanical malfunctions we had no radio communications.

128 Q. After this experience, what is your reaction to manning TD's with these troops?

A. I feel that the materiel will outshoot, outmaneuver the Germans when properly manned. I do not have confidence in these gun crews, because of their actions as stated above.

129 Q. Do you consider these troops efficient in reconnaissance work?

A. No Sir, because after what I consider thorough instruction in map reading, they cannot orient a map or go from one place to another by means of a map.

88 554

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EXHIBIT "A"

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JONES

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Unsworn statement of Lt. Col. A. C. DOHNMANN, Acting Chief of Staff of Task Force WAHL.

130

The chain of command of tank destroyers operating under Task Force WAHL is through the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, commanded by Major George McCutchen.

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EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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DOHNMANN

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By SB HAW, Dab

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Summary of Evidence given by LT. COLONEL ROY V. PORTER, 3d Battalion, 313th Infantry, 15 January 1945.

131

On 7 January 1945, a company of tanks and TD's were to arrive and on Monday PM, 8 January 1945, I received 7 out of 12 TD's; two of them going into the ditch while getting into position. Another TD was hit and the weapon burned from the outside but the tank was not evacuated. I spoke to the Company Commander of Company "C", 827 TD Battalion and 3 days later the crew still did not intend to retrieve the tank. This occurred near Bois de Hoffen.

132

Captain Creighton, Company Commander of Company "K", 313th Infantry, reported that the gun commander of one of his TD's stated that he could not fire from his tank for 20 minutes because he would have to warm up the engine that long before he could move into firing position.

133

The Company Commander of Company "I", 313th Infantry, reported that a TD in Oberroedern refused to fire at 2 German tanks because they said they were flying a red flag and no red flag was seen by the Company Commander of Company "I", and no shots were fired by them.

134

About Thursday or Friday a group of Germans on foot and in one half-track went from east to west across our position in Oberroedern. We fired upon them and they abandoned the half-track. I ordered the Company Commander of Company "C" to get rid of it and one of his TD's went about dusk, fired 4 rounds all high, leaving the half-track which was recovered by the Germans later that evening.

135

I talked to General Wahl about shooting up a pillbox. Two TD's were to shoot the pillbox at night, but I found after day-light it had not been done. I sent Lt. Hayden, an antitank officer, up to force the TD's to fire the pillbox. He found the entire gun crew in a basement and the gun unmounted, and stated that they would not come out of the basement because the Germans were there. Lt. Hayden ordered the TD's out at the point of a pistol. They fired the pillbox but the results were unknown.

136

An outpost in Oberroedern stated that they saw a German tank stuck on the road between Buhl and Hatten and that the crew was trying to get it out. I asked if it was visible from the ground and they said yes, and then sent someone up to fire the tank. Lt. Price, Company "I", called me back and said the TD's refused to fire upon the German tank. I issued a direct order to fire the tank or would shoot the entire crew, and informed General Wahl of this action. Lt. Price got the gun commander out on the ground at the point of a rifle, but the German tank was out of sight after all this procedure.


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EXHIBIT "A"

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PORTER



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

137 On 14 January 1945 I was promised 4 white crews to replace 4 colored crews. Also during the afternoon of 14 January 1945, the Company Commander of Company "I" stated that a TD had been hit by enemy fire and that equipment on the outside of the tank had caught fire. It was parked in a barn with 75 antitank mines and was of extreme importance that the crew get the tank out of there. The men operating the TD refused to drive the TD out of the barn. I ordered the Company Commander to kill the crew if they did not obey. He fired 5 times and missed them all. Lt Southerland, Company "I", 313th Infantry, tried to get the crew to drive it out of the barn and attempted to start it himself, but could not do so. He called for a tank to pull it out of the barn, but it got there too late. The mines had already been removed by the 3d Platoon, Company "I", after the fire started on the TD.

138 I have been told that we have approximately 250 white replacements in this Division, who are trained in this work. I have considered requesting my Commanding General to let me form TD crews out of these men.


58 557

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EXHIBIT "A"

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PORTER



Lt. Col. ROY V. PORTER, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 313th Infantry, appeared before the Inspector, Lt. Col. J. M. Pennycuik, I.G.D., at the 3d Battalion CP on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and further testified as follows:

139 Q. What is the chain of command from you to the tank destroyers?

A. They come from me to the TD company's commander. I have had poor communication and I have gone up to the gun positions or have sent an officer to the spot. My idea of the TDs is that they don't take orders from my headquarters but fire on targets they deem necessary.

JMB 140 Q. Do the infantry company commanders request fire from them?

A. Yes, Sir.

JMB 141 Q. What company of the 827th TD Bn. have TDs with you?

A. Company "C" and one platoon of Company "A".

142 Q. Have you anything else to add?

A. No, Sir.

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PORTER

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Summary of Evidence given by MAJOR LEON F MILLER, Executive Officer,
2d Battalion, 313th Infantry, 16 January 1945.

143

I cannot give a sworn statement as to what the action of the section of Company B, 827th TD Battalion has been, which is with my Battalion in Hatten, as I have not actually been there with them. However, I can tell you as hearsay evidence what men that have been wounded and evacuated, and also what the company commanders of our companies have reported regarding Company B, 827th TD Battalion's action in Hatten. It has been reported to me that they have knocked out four Mark-4 German tanks, two self-propelled guns, two German scout cars, and one German half-track. All the men of my unit that I have talked to, say that these men of the 827th TD Battalion have done a grand job in Hatten.

144

I know nothing of any other unit of the 827th TD Battalion, but our men have no criticism to make of that portion of the 827th TD Battalion that is working with us.


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EXHIBIT "A"

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MILLER



Summary of Evidence given by CAPTAIN CARTER T. HOLBROOK JR, O-1305250,
79th Division, 15 January 1945.

145 The 827th TD Battalion joined the TF Wahl on 8 January 1945, and the Battalion was at once attached to the 813th TD Battalion for operations. On the evening of 9 January 1945, around 2000 hours, the Battalion Commanders of the 813th and 827th TD Battalions met with the Commanding General, TF Wahl, at CP in Surbourg, France and received instructions to move the 1st Platoon of the 827th TD Bn from Leiterswiller area to Niederbetschdorf where they would meet guides from the 232d Inf Regt., who would lead them to Soufflenheim. Lt Young, Liaison Officer of the 827th TD Battalion, stated that the TD Platoon started its movement about midnight and so far as he could determine arrived at Niederbetschdorf about 0200 hours and did not know where they were between 0200 and 0730 hours.

146 The following evening the Commanding General, TF Wahl, gave the Commanding Officer of the 827th TD Battalion a direct order to move 4 TD's from Rittershoffen to Leiterswiller. It took them $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours to make this trip, a distance of about 3 kilometers.


147 On 14 January 1945, Col Porter, 313th Infantry Regiment, reported about 1300 hours that he had some mines, and a TD in a warehouse that was on fire. The men operating the TD refused to drive the TD out of the warehouse and the TD crews of the other two M-18's couldn't be found. The mines were removed from the building by members of the 313th Inf Regiment.

58 560

EXHIBIT "A"

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HOLBROOK



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary of Evidence given by 1ST LT. GEORGE W. JONES, O-1305934,
3d Battalion, 313th Infantry Regiment, 15 January 1945.

148 Lt. Col. Porter sent me to Oberroedern to investigate and assist in whatever trouble the TD was in at that time. We did not know what was going on, but upon arrival I saw there was a burning building from which the 3d platoon of Company "I", 3d Battalion, were carrying antitank mines. Several cases of these mines had been deposited in the street across from the burning building at a distance of about 30 yards from the fire. Lt. Southerland was present at the time and was just leaving to ask the Liaison Officer to attempt to pull the TD from the burning barn with another tank. I went up to the burning building to see if any other action could be taken. Lt. Morrison of "I" Company went with me and as we arrived near the building the ammunition in the TD began to explode. The tank arrived about 3 minutes after the ammunition began to explode. I waved it back to its former position. In my opinion it was too late to rescue the TD. The TD crew was not present in the burning tank and I did not see them in the vicinity.


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EXHIBIT "A"

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JONES



651

Summary of Evidence given by 1ST LT. VERNON L. HAYDEN, O-1829080,
3d Battalion 313th Infantry Regiment, 15 January 1945.

On 8 January 1945, we received word of a German attack. The Battalion Commander sent me forward to get the TD's. I found the Executive Officer of Company "C", 827th T.D. Battalion and asked him for a platoon of TD's to stop this attack. The Executive Officer of Company "C" said he could not move the tanks until his Company Commander had returned. I then returned to Lt. Col. Porter and reported the fact to him. Col. Porter sent me back to Company "C" to bring the Executive Officer to him. The Executive Officer was not there when I got back, so returned to Col. Porter with the platoon commander who has since been killed. Colonel Schriber, Commanding Officer of the 315th Infantry Regiment, was with Lt. Col. Porter when I returned with this officer. Colonel Schriber gave the platoon commander a direct order to go to the position and stop this tank attack which was coming. The platoon commander then accompanied 3 TD's of Company "C" to position. But by this time the German tanks had departed and it was too late to fire. In the meantime my 57's had stopped the tank attack.


150 Friday, 12 January 1945, Lt. Col. Porter sent me forward to have the TD's fire on an enemy pillbox and an abandoned half-track. I went directly to the tanks and found no one on the TD's. Then I walked around the buildings and found some of the tank crews and got 1 tank crew which I sent out to fire on the pillbox. I stood there personally to see that they would fire on the pillbox, and made them fire 10 rounds on the pillbox. The gun commander remained behind the building until I ordered him out to observe the fire. They made several hits on the pillbox. The half-track had been removed during the night, so I did not have them fire on it. I can identify the gun commander but do not know his name or TD number.

58 562

EXHIBIT "A"

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HAYDEN



CONFIDENTIAL

1st Lt. WILLIS P. SOUTHERLAND, 0518980, Inf, Commanding Officer, Company "I", 313th Infantry, appeared before the Inspector, Lt. Col. J. M. Penny-cuick, I.G.D., on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness. The 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained to the witness. He stated that he understood them and testified substantially as follows:

151 On the 11th or 12th of January 1945, I observed a German half-track in a creek near a bridge about 1000 yards to our front. I sent one of my sergeants up to a tank destroyer of Company "C", 827th TD Bn. and requested them to fire on the half-track. The sergeant came back and after waiting for about two or three hours, Lt Price a lieutenant of my company, went up to the gun position with a carbine and told them to get the hell out of the cellar and man the gun. Then Lt. Price pointed out the target.

152 They cranked up and pulled around the house and fired four or five rounds, all high. Then they ceased firing and pulled the TD back and went into the cellar again.

153 I don't know about a TD that refused to fire on a German tank between Buhl and Hatten. It is possible that Lt. Price of my company knows about this tank, but he is in a front line position and it isn't advisable to try to reach him today.

154 I can say that the 827th TD Bn. has given us support the last two days.


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58 563

EXHIBIT "A"

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SOUTHERLAND



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Statement of Colonel GUY S. MELOY, Jr., 016892, GSC, Chief of Staff, 103d Infantry Division.

155

I was Chief of Staff of the Tank Destroyer Training Center at Camp Hood, Texas, during a portion of the time the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion trained at the post. I can state that we had no greater disciplinary problems with them than we did with any other colored troops on the post. The main problems we had with them were training ones. They failed their AGF tests consistantly until one of them we thought was deliberate. When they left Camp Hood for the California Training Center their vehicle maintenance was the poorest of any unit at Camp Hood.


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58 564

EXHIBIT "A"

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MELOY



~~SECRET~~

Capt. WILLIE A. MAYO, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Lt. Col. J. M. Pennyquick, I.G.D., at Company "A" CP at Surbourg, France, on 18 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number and organization.

A. Willie A. Mayo, Captain, 01169233, FA, Commanding Officer, Company "A", 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were explained to the witness who stated that he understood them.

156

Q. How long have you been commander of this Company?

A. A year ago, since 13 January 1944.

157

Q. Were you with this Company during the entire training period?

A. Not during the entire period. In the final period I was with the battalion as S-2 while we were training in the California desert.

158

Q. Do you recall the approximate dates and the ratings given to your company on the various tests while training?

A. I don't remember the dates but we fired for the first test and we failed by half a point. We were supposed to make 65 and we only made 64 $\frac{1}{2}$. It was about the 6th of August 1944.

159

Q. Did you have a retest?

A. Yes, Sir, about three weeks later.

160

Q. Did you pass?

A. Company "A" got the highest score on the retest which was about 85, but we passed this time.

161

Q. Did you have any indirect fire training?

A. None with the M-18. We did have some indirect firing immediately after I took over the company in the desert. We did have some indirect fire training with the M-10 with panoramic sights.

162

Q. You had no training with the M-18?

A. None but what I gave them myself. There was none during the battalion training period.


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EXHIBIT "A"

~~SECRET~~
- 41 -

MAYO



163

Q. How do you classify the men in your company at the present time in regard to efficiency?

A. If it was possible to get replacements I could have made it a company as good as any other, but I couldn't get replacements so that I could get rid of no good people. The majority of the men would have made a good outfit.

Q. What is your classification of the whole company?

A. Nothing above satisfactory. And that's stretching it.

165

Q. On the night of 6 January 1945, when the battalion formed up to move, what was the reason that your company could not move?

A. I had about fifty minutes from the time I was released from the company commanders' meeting at the battalion to get my company out on the road. On returning to my CP I called the platoon commanders together, including the attached reconnaissance platoon which had just been attached to me. I gave them the instructions that we would move out at 2030 hours which was approximately forty minutes before we could move out. I gave them the order in which they would march and had them line up in the bivouac area in that sequence.

166 Q. What town were you in?

A. Bossendorf, Sir. I told the platoon commanders when they got their platoons formed in the order that I gave them that they report back to me. At 2030 hours, the time we were supposed to move out, none of the platoon commanders had reported to me. I immediately notified the battalion commander that I could not move out on the time scheduled.

167 Q. What action did you take?

A. I investigated why the platoon commanders had not reported to me. I had waited too long for them to report and realize I should have checked up on them sooner and not at the last minute.

168

Q. What did your investigation disclose as to the reason for the delay?

A. Some of the platoon commanders could not find the drivers of their vehicles.

169

Q. Which commanders were they?


A. Lt. Calahan and Lt. McNeil.

58 566

EXHIBIT "A"

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MAYO




- 170 Q. Upon further investigation by Lt. Calahan and Lt. McNeil what did they find?
- A. They found that most of the men but not the drivers were under the influence of alcohol.
- 171 Q. What control did your platoon officers exercise over these men during the period you were bivouacked in Bossendorf?
- A. As we pulled in on the outskirts of the town I assigned each platoon a sector and had them point their guns in a certain direction around the bivouac for security. I had a detail of the 1st sergeant and a platoon sergeant to look for buildings for the men to sleep in.
- 172 Q. Did you pull out the same night you pulled in?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- 173 Q. After billets were assigned were the men allowed to go into the buildings?
- A. Yes, Sir, except for the guards.
- 174 Q. From then till approximately 2030 hours you were alerted?
- A. No, Sir, I was alerted about one hour earlier than that.
- 175 Q. Were you alerted prior to the time you were called to the battalion meeting?
- A. No, Sir. The battalion commander said that he had not been able to contact the Combat Command "B" commander and he would bring back the instructions from there and thought that we would be there for the night.
- 176 Q. You were at this meeting with the battalion commander when he alerted you for one hour?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- 177 Q. Did you proceed to your company CP and alert your platoon leaders?
- A. Yes, Sir.
- 178 Q. What did you do from the time you alerted your platoon leaders until they were to report back to you?
- A. I plotted my route of march on the map and made sure the CP would be prepared to move out on the scheduled time.

58 567

EXHIBIT "A"

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MAYO



- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 179 Q. Did you have any idea that the men might be drunk and unable to move?
- A. No, Sir. They never failed to make a move before.
- 180 Q. Have you then, any instances since that date of men failing to comply with orders?
- A. Yes, Sir, I have. The platoon commanders tell me that they had to order the crews back on the guns three times when there was some small arms fire coming from the front.
- 181 Q. Did you take any disciplinary action in these cases?
- A. No, Sir.
- 182 Q. After the night they were unable to move?
- A. No, Sir. After they were unable to move at the scheduled time I formed the entire company into a circle and kept them out there for forty minutes in the cold.
- 183 Q. Then were you ready to move?
- A. Yes, Sir. The instructions I gave in front of all the men there was that no man who had alcohol on his breath would not drive.
- 184 Q. How many of your tank destroyers are in operation right now?
- A. There are eleven of my destroyers operating and I have three of "C" Company's attached and three out at some other place.
- 185 Q. Where is the twelfth tank destroyer of your company?
- A. It is in the battalion maintenance now.
- 186 Q. What was the reason for sending it to battalion maintenance?
- A. It was throwing oil. I had one that was knocked by a mortar dropping in the turret and it was also sent in to the battalion.
- 187 Q. Who mans the destroyers from "C" Company?
- A. These three destroyers from "C" Company are manned by my crews and my destroyers have gone from battalion maintenance to another company. This is the usual procedure now that we are in combat.
- 188 Q. How many enemy tanks and vehicles has your company been credited with?

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MAYO

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A. We have been credited with four tanks and two pill boxes. That's all that has been reported to me at the present time. Although there has been one other tracked vehicle knocked out in the vicinity of Rittershoffen, but that one hasn't been confirmed yet.

189 Q. Are you up to full officer strength at present?

A. I have only one officer in the hospital and he is the only one short. An officer was loaned to me from "B" Company until the one returned from the hospital.

190 Q. What state were you born and raised in?

A. North Carolina.

191 Q. What states are your officers from?

A. Lt. McNeil is from New York, Lt. Calahan is from Mississippi, Lt Roder is from Oklahoma and Lt Kress is from Pennsylvania.

192 Q. Have you anything else to say at this time?

A. There was one incident where the men got some schnapps and my 1st sergeant was threatened and he shot the wrong man when try- to hit the man who had threatened him. The man that was hit was grazed in the stomach.

193 Q. Have you preferred charges against the man?

A. No, we have just questioned him and have not preferred charges.

194 Q. Have you reduced him?

A. No, Sir. I talked with the colonel and it was the first time the 1st sergeant had gotten into trouble. The colonel also talked to him.

195 Q. Who assigns targets to your TDs and who do they get their disposition orders from?


A. I have four guns with Col. Porter. The other four guns are with the 232d Infantry in Runtzenheim and Soufflenheim under the section platoon commander. Two guns are in the woods south of Hatten under my control and "B" Company of the 242d Infantry have the remaining two. They fire whenever enemy tanks appear and work with the infantry. Though two guns are directly under the platoon commander and fire on his order at targets of opportunity.

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EXHIBIT "A"

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CONFIDENTIAL

MAYO



[REDACTED]

The guns with Col. Porter take orders from Col. Porter. One platoon commander with the 232d Infantry is in the sector to prevent an armored attack and gives his own orders to fire on targets that might appear.

196 Q. Have you anything else to add at this time?

A. No, Sir.


58 570

EXHIBIT "A"

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- 46 -

MAYO



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary of Evidence given by 1ST LT GEORGE F YOUNG, O-1824409, Commanding Officer of Company B, 827th TD Battalion, who appeared before the Inspector, Lt Colonel J. M. Pennycuik, I.G.D., on 16 January 1945. The witness was duly sworn and the rights of a witness under the provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood them, and testified as follows:

197 I took command of Company B, 827th TD Battalion, on 15 January 1945. Prior to that time Capt Douglas H Sullivan was the commanding officer of Company B. Capt Sullivan was wounded on the morning of 15 January 1945.

198 I was assigned to Company B on 15 December 1944 and remained with that unit until 11 January 1945, when I was transferred to Company C. I was moved back from Company C to Company B on 15 January 1945. I originally joined the 827th TD Battalion on 1 May 1944. I enlisted in the Army in June of 1942 at Ft Knox, Kentucky and went to OCS on 11 March 43 at Camp Hood, Texas. Upon completion of OCS, I was assigned to the 663d TD Battalion which was redesignated an Armored FA Unit. When the Unit was redesignated, the TD officers in the unit were transferred to other TD Battalions. I was assigned as assistant battalion S-3 of the 827th TD Battalion about a week after I joined them.

199 The 827th TD Battalion was activated at Camp Forest, Tennessee approximately 3 years ago. The unit took their basic training at Camp Forest, which was extended from 13 to 17 weeks. Upon completion of basic training, the unit went to Camp Hood, Texas for more training, and then they were made school troops. They were given another period of unit training after their completion of the tour as school troops. They then went to the desert at Indio, California and then were transferred to Ft Huachuca, Arizona. I joined the unit at Ft Huachuca, Arizona.

200 The information just given above is to the best of my memory from the records of the Battalion which I read when I was assigned as Asst S-3.

201 Major Harry L Lyons, commanding the battalion at the time I joined, told me that the unit status was not clear as they had failed a number of training tests and it was under consideration by a higher command to redesignate the unit as some other branch of service. He also told me that General Davis (Colored Inspector General) and another person purported to be the President's Racial Advisor had visited the unit. As far as I know we never received a copy of their report.

202 From this point on, everything I tell you is from my own personal knowledge.


58 571

EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 47 -

YOUNG



203

Captain Douglas H Sullivan joined the 827th TD Battalion about the same time I did. He was made Battalion S-3 and I was made Asst Bn S-3. Shortly after that Capt Sullivan went to the Command & General Staff School and I was acting S-3 during his absence. We had our I.T.P. test approximately 1 May 1944, and to the best of my memory the unit was rated unsatisfactory on about half the subjects. We received instructions immediately thereafter, to clear the deficiencies and we were given another test. We received a letter from XXIII Corps in May 1944, requesting us to submit a training program to prepare the unit to perform its primary mission. We were to be given tests on this training about 1 Aug 1944. Between May 1944 and 1 August 1944, we held an intensive training program.

204

The unit retook their I.T.P. tests with exception of firing their TD weapons and passed all but one or two subjects. There was no suitable place at Ft Huachuca to fire our TD weapons, so the unit moved to Cp Hood, Texas.

205

We had completed all the I.T.P. tests and were ready to fire our weapons when we moved to Cp Hood. We took the AGF tests about 1 August 44. Company B passed the tests, the balance of the Battalion was marked unsatisfactory. Lt McMasters, now commanding Company C, had Company B at that time. The umpire testing Company B told me that the Company passed satisfactory, but that Lt McMasters had passed the tests rather than the Company.

206

Companies A and C and the Battalion retook the tests, and all units were passed. During the firing tests I was told to take extra ammunition to the range and that the TD's would continue firing until they passed their tests. I do not know who issued this order and I do not know whether it required any extra ammunition for them to qualify.

207

During this time the reconnaissance company took the M.I.T. tests and were given unsatisfactory. A very short time later the tests were regiven, but I never received information on whether or not they were passed.

208

The Battalion's training in indirect fire was waved. We were immediately shipped overseas. On approximately 18 December 1944, I was moved from Asst Bn S-3 to Company B and made Executive Officer.

209

We moved from our assembly area to the XV Corps a day or two later and during the period we were with the XV Corps, Company B was attached to Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division and put into the line.

210


The Company, less one platoon, was in support of the 714th Tank Battalion. The one platoon was in support of the 56th Armored Infantry. It was a very quiet sector of the front and we did not fire a shell during the period. The general area received a few stray rounds of enemy artillery, but there were no concentrations fired on our positions. Lt Kelly, commanding the platoon with the 56th Armored Infantry, merely guarded their CP and reported no instances of any nature to me.

58 572

EXHIBIT "A"

- 48 -

YOUNG



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

211

On the night of 24 December 1944, Capt Sullivan made a tour of the gun positions to check their security. He went to the platoon commanded by Lt Brescia (K.I.A.) talked to him awhile and then left his TD for the adjoining one. The guard on the adjoining TD called 'halt' and immediately began firing at Capt Sullivan. Capt Sullivan stated that he started talking to the man and calmed him down. Lt Brescia reported to Captain Sullivan that he ordered the gun commander to immediately jump out of the TD and see what happened while he (Lt Brescia) was putting on his boots which he had taken off to treat his feet for the prevention of trench foot. The gun commander refused to go. Lt Brescia did not prefer charges. That same night Capt Sullivan went to a TD in Lt Teske's platoon and the guard on the gun did not challenge him. The guard was not asleep and simply stated that he did not see him. No charges were preferred in this instance.

212

There were a number of instances reported to me during this period in which the guns were left unguarded for short periods of time, generally when the men were gathering wood to build a fire. The entire Battalion had been instructed in the United States to remain with their TD's at all times, and the men in Company B were again instructed when the first instance occurred. The first instance occurred while they were in the line. No charges were preferred in any of these cases. We were ordered out of the line, I don't remember what day, and had some difficulty in getting all the men into their proper positions. We moved that evening and the next morning pulled into a small town. That night when we were to leave the town, I went up to the head of the column to report to the Battalion that Company B was ready to move. While I was talking at the head of the column, someone came up and reported that Company A could not move because some of the men were drunk.

213

I was moved to Company C a day or so later and was an officer in Company C when an M-18 burned in a barn containing a large number of mines. I have no first-hand knowledge of this instance. I went back to Company B when Capt Sullivan was wounded in action on 15 January 1945, and have commanded Company B since that time. At the present time I am not short of officers for I received two officers from the reconnaissance company and one from the headquarters company. At the present time I have three TD's with the 2d Battalion, 315th Infantry, in the town of Hatten. The reports I have received as to their action has been entirely satisfactory. Lt Brescia was killed in this position and Lt Jones, a replacement from a reconnaissance company, is now in command. I am sending two relief crews and an officer to Hatten tonight to relieve the men. I have three other guns in the vicinity of Rittershoffen and two guns in the vicinity of Niederbetschdorf. The other four guns of my Company are either in battalion maintenance or in the ordnance for repairs.

214

I was born and raised in the State of Texas and can get along with colored troops. Naturally I prefer to serve with white troops.

58 573

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

- 49 -

YOUNG

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SB HWA, Dab

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIRST LIEUTENANT DONALD G. McMASTERS, Company C, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 15 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Donald G. McMasters, 1st Lt, O-1168372, Company C, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated he understood.

215 Q. What are your duties?

A. Company Commander of Company C, 827th TD Battalion.

216 Q. How long have you been Company Commander?

A. Since 8 January 1945.

217 Q. How long have you been with Company C?

A. I came to this Company on 8 August 1944 as Company Commander, and served with it since that time.

218 Q. State briefly an estimate of the efficiency of this Company?

A. I have some men in this Company that will do everything I want them to, on the other hand I have men that I cannot give any mission to with any degree of trust.

219 Q. What percent of the personnel do you feel you can trust?

A. I would say that a definite minority will complete a mission to the best of their ability.

220 Q. How do you explain the burning of one TD about 1500 hours, 14 January 1945?

A. At that time I was down with my 3d Plt and was called to report to my 2d Plt immediately because of mutiny. I arrived there as soon as I could. I was stopped in the western end of Oberroedern by Lt Sourenian, who told me that the ammunition on the vehicle was about to explode and that it was completely afire.


58 574


EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 50 -

McMASTERS




221 Q. Have you had any trouble with the crews on your M-18's?

A. Not to my knowledge, no Sir.

222 Q. What about this report of mutiny to which you referred?

A. Sgt Crawford, the gun commander of the gun that was on fire had ordered his gun crew to evacuate the M-18, and the crew refused to do so.

223 Q. Have you any other instance of inefficiency?

A. On Saturday I was informed of a possible tank attack. I immediately left for my 2d Plt, where I contacted an M-18 commanded by S/Sgt Hodge. There was no one around the gun, but found the crew in the house near the gun. I directly ordered him to put his entire gun crew on that M-18. While I was alerting my other gun crews the attack started. I alerted one crew, and the rest of the crews were alerted by Lt Richards of the 813th TD Battalion. I immediately returned to the gun commanded by S/Sgt Hodge and entered the barn where the M-18 was in position. I called for the gun crew and found one man, Cpl Tindle, in front of the gun, the remainder of the crew was in the house. I again alerted the crew, gave them another direct order to man their M-18, and pointed out an enemy tank to their direct front. I told them to take that tank under fire and left to alert one more gun crew for the attack. They did not fire at the tank.

224 Q. Do you know why they did not fire at the tank?

A. No Sir.

225 Q. Did you have communications with each Platoon or Section in your Company?

A. I had wire communications with each Platoon, and each Platoon has telephone communications with each Section in that Platoon. I do not have radio communications with each Platoon.

226 Q. Could you have alerted the Platoons and Sections by telephone?

A. Yes Sir, to the best of my knowledge.

227 Q. Then why did you personally take time to go from section to section?

A. After alerting each Platoon by telephone, I went to the sections mentioned above to check and make sure that my order was being obeyed.

58 575

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 228 Q. Did you take any action against S/Sgt Hodge?
A. No Sir.
- 229 Q. Is S/Sgt Hodge still in command of one of your M-18's?
A. No Sir.
- 230 Q. Where is Sgt Hodge and his crew at this time?
A. Sgt Hodge and his crew are now in the Battalion CP.
- 231 Q. Do you plan any action against Sgt Hodge?
A. I plan to court martial them, Sir.
- 232 Q. Are the majority of your men in the company basically trained to operate their organic weapons efficiently?
A. Efficiently to the best of my knowledge.
- 233 Q. Do you base this on the training and firing they have had?
A. Yes Sir.
- 234 Q. Was this action the Company's first campaign experience?
A. Yes Sir.
- 235 Q. Can your Company fire indirect fire?
A. No Sir. With a bit of training, yes Sir.
- 236 Q. Do you train your men to replace each other, such as the gunner being able to drive the vehicle?
A. All of them can operate as gunners, but not as drivers.
- 237 Q. Can S/Sgt Hodge drive this vehicle?
A. No Sir, I do not think so.
- 238 Q. How many M-18's do you have in your Company?
A. At present I have eight.

58 576

EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 52 -

McMASTERS

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NWD 730022
Authority
By SB HAWA, Dala

239 Q. Where are the other four?

A. Three are in the rear being repaired and one has been knocked out.

240 Q. Are all eight M-18's manned by your personnel?

A. No Sir. I have 6 gun crews, the other 2 being manned by the 813th TD Battalion.

241 Q. Whom do you get your orders from?

A. I take them from Lt Colonel Porter.

242 Q. Have you anything further to state at this time?

A. I believe that the majority of the trouble is merely from fear. The fear seems to be in the majority of the men.

243 Q. Where were you born and raised?

A. Syracuse, New York.

244 Q. Do you know where all your Officers were born and raised?

A. Lt Sourenian was born and raised in New York. I do not know where the other officers were born and raised.

245 Q. How many officers have you?

A. Five Sir.

246 Q. Do you feel your Platoon Commanders are reasonably efficient?

A. Yes Sir.

247 Q. Do you feel the NCO's are efficient?


A. Some of them, Sir.

58 577

EXHIBIT "A"

- 53 -

McMASTERS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1st Lt. DONALD G. McMASTERS, Company "C", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Lt. Col. J. M. Pennycuick, I.G.D., on 18 January 1945, and after being reminded he was still under oath, testified as follows:

248 Q. On the night of 8 January when you were asked to send your tank destroyers into position, why did only seven out of twelve arrive?

A. We left our area and when we arrived in town here we had only two M-18s, the remainder of the column had been broken and at that time we didn't know where they were. We waited in town from 0400 hours until 0600 hours. We sent two different parties back to locate them. One under Sgt. Pate, Company Reconnaissance Sergeant and the other one was under a man from the 813th TD Bn. who was sent to us before the remainder of the column arrived. At this time a call came for us to take up positions and we immediately moved out with the two M-18s we had.

249 Q. How soon did the balance of the column arrive?

A. I don't know, Sir. Capt. Caw and myself were taken by an infantry man to Pill Box #6. About the time we got in the pill box the German attack started and we were unable to get out. We were in there approximately three and one half hours. When we did get out the Captain and myself started down through the woods to pick up the M-18s. It was then the Captain was wounded and when I reached the rear I found the remainder of the column had arrived.

250 Q. Did you put the remainder of the column in position?

A. When I got back one of the officers in the company had been ordered by Col. Schriber to put his TDs in position in the "K" Company sector. The 2d Platoon was in position in the vicinity of Oberroedern. Upon my return there seemed to be utter confusion among the personnel and also there was confusion as to the location of the M-18s.

251 Q. On Thursday or Friday of that week a half-track was pointed out as the target in Oberroedern. Four or five rounds were fired and no hits were made on the half-track and then the TD withdrew. What do you know about the incident?

A. All I know is that they fired four or five rounds at a half-track and that they did not hit it.

252 Q. Some of the TD crews were found in the basements when they should have been manning the TDs. What do you know about it?


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EXHIBIT "A"

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- 54 -

McMASTERS



- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- A. The TD crews were given orders to keep two men on each M-18 at all times. The gunner or the gun commander was to be present. I had given the orders that the remainder could be in the house as long as they could man their guns in a rapid manner.

253

- Q. Did you take any positive action when you found the crews not manning the guns?

- A. I didn't take any punitive action at the time. I got them together and bawled the hell out of them.

254

- Q. After that time what checks did you make to insure they complied with your orders?

- A. The platoon leaders were given orders to check to see that the guns were manned at all times as they had been ordered. I also made periodic checks myself.

255

- Q. Did you find any of the guns not manned after this incident?

- A. Yes, Sir, I did. On Saturday the 12th of January I had been informed of a possible tank attack near Oberroedern. My platoons were alerted through my platoon leaders and I immediately left for Oberroedern. Upon reaching the first M-18 I found no one near the gun. I immediately called them from the basement and gave the sergeant in command a direct order to have his entire crew man the gun. I explained to him that the attack should be within a short time. I immediately left and visited another gun farther up in the town. As I arrived there the attack had started. I pointed out two German tanks and knowing that that crew saw the target I returned to the gun whose crew I had just alerted. When I returned I found only one man near the gun. The remainder of the crew were in the basement of the house. I called the crew out again and gave them a direct order to completely man the gun. I pointed out the target to them. I didn't stay but left to alert another gun crew to their right.

256

- Q. Did you take any punitive action against that crew?

- A. Yes, Sir. The crew has been sent to the rear under guard and I have had the gun commander of that gun recommended for reduction and be tried by a courts-martial.

257

- Q. Who do your TDs receive orders from and who assigns their targets?

- A. Their administrative orders come from our battalion headquarters and their tactical orders come from the 313th Infantry, 3d Battalion Headquarters. The orders are given through me to the platoon leaders who in turn give them to the gun crews. There


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- 55 -

McMASTERS

EXHIBIT "A"



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

were no instructions given the gun crews to my knowledge that they fire without orders from their platoon leaders.

258 Q. If enemy armor appears in the vicinity of a gun and the platoon leader is not there to order them to fire, what are the men of gun crew instructed to do?

A. The crews have received instructions personally from me to fire on enemy vehicles without the presence of an officer when within range and identity is certain. This procedure is followed after they have been alerted by their platoon leaders. If anyone points out an enemy vehicle that is properly identified or within range of the gun they have been instructed to fire on the target.

259 Q. Who selects and orders the TDs of your company into position?

A. We are given the general locality and sector to be covered by the TDs through the 313th Infantry, 3d Bn. Headquarters. The platoon leader selects the position for his guns and puts them into position.

58 580

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EXHIBIT "A"

- 56 -

McMASTERS

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NWD 730022
Authority
By SB HAWA, DAB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECOND LIEUTENANT HRANT SOURENIAN, Company C, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 15 January 1945, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Hrant Sourenian, 2d Lt, O-1824699, Company C, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained. The witness stated that he understood.

260 Q. What are your duties?

A. Executive Officer of Company C, 827th TD Battalion.

261 Q. How long have you been executive officer?

A. One month, Sir.

262 Q. Please state briefly your estimate of the efficiency of Company C?

A. In my opinion Company C is not efficient enough for battle. We have men in the company that are capable of doing the job. We also have men in the company not capable of doing the job who offset the functioning or coordination of this company.

263 Q. Will you give one or two examples?

A. On the morning of 13 January 1945 at approximately 0500 hours, Lt McMasters, the Company Commander, sent T/5 Frank Bright to the gun position approximately 500 yards east of the company CP to alert the men for a probable tank attack. Upon his return, T/5 Bright told the Company Commander that there was no one there or around one gun. The Company Commander told me to go over there to investigate the matter. Upon arriving in the gun positions, I found no men in or around the TD's of either gun. I called the names of the gun commanders as loud as I could, but no one answered and I returned after looking around to the CP and reported to Lt McMasters that no one was around the guns.

264 Q. What are your instructions to the gun crews in reference to remaining at the guns?


A. Two men have to be at the guns, awake, at all times.

58 581

EXHIBIT "A"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 57 -

SOURENIAN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

265 Q. Were the buildings near the guns which were unmanned?

A. Yes Sir.

266 Q. Did you look in those buildings for the gun crews?

A. Yes Sir, and I did not find them.

267 Q. Have you anything further to say?

A. One gun crew out of this company manned a TD at Hatten in a manner which reflected great credit to themselves.

58 582

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT "A"

- 58 -

SOURENIAN

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SL HWA, Dab

Materiel Assigned to the 827th TD Battalion


<u>Materiel</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Towed (75mm)	21 Apr 42	2 Sep 42
Self-Propelled (M-10)	2 Sep 42	12 Jun 43
Towed (3")	14 Jun 43	21 Jul 43
Self-Propelled (M-18)	22 Jul 43	Present Date

Commanding Officers and Approximate Dates of Command

Major Adams	20 Apr 42	25 Apr 42
Major Oliver	25 Apr 42	29 Apr 42
Lt. Colonel Ryder	30 Apr 42	25 Aug 42
Major John W. Darrah	4 Sep 42	23 Jul 43
Lt. Colonel Hutson	23 Jul 43	25 Aug 43
Lt. Colonel Herschel D. Baker	25 Aug 43	28 Feb 44
Major Harry Lyons	28 Feb 44	3 Jul 44
Lt. Colonel Vander Zwiep	5 Aug 44	Present Date

583

EXHIBIT "C"



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

dr. 182

ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
827TH TD BN

Conducted by:

N. L. ADAMS,
Colonel, I.G.D.,
Inspector General.

Med. 31

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DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730027
Authority
By SB RAN, Dab

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO #46, U. S. Army

28 January 1945

AG 333

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation.

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO #758, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is Report of Investigation conducted by the Inspector General VI Corps concerning the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

2. The recommendations of the Corps Commander are indicated on page 5 of the report.

For the Commanding General:

Michael L. Connors
MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Report of Investigation (4 copies)


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C O N F I D E N T I A L



~~SECRET~~

GCT 322 (TK-ED)O&E

8th Ind.

19 April 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

TO: Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, APO 887, U.S. Army

1. The recommendations contained in 7th indorsement to basic communication are approved.

2. Desire necessary steps be taken to nominate the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion (colored) as one of the units of its type surplus to redeployment requirements.

APPROVED:

H. R. BULL
Major General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

58 476

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By SB N/A, Data

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(Ltr, Hq Seventh Army, Ref No X-539, subject: "Inactivation of 827 TD Bn", 31 Jan 45)

AG 322 OpGC

7th Ind.

WLS/erw

Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, APO 887

12 April 1945

TO: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Forward)

1. It is recommended that the action proposed by the Commanding General, 6th Army Group, as contained in paragraph 5, 5th Indorsement, be approved for the following reasons:

a. The unit is urgently needed on the L of C mission to which the Commanding General, 6th Army Group has committed it.

b. It does not appear probable in view of the state of training and required changes in key commissioned and enlisted personnel that the unit could be withdrawn from its current mission and retrained in sufficient time for commitment in its normal combat role.

c. Disbandment and conversion as recommended by the Commanding General, Seventh US Army, could react unfavorably to the Theater Commander. It is considered that such action could also result in adverse criticism of the War Department.

d. Any action other than that proposed by the Commanding General, 6th Army Group, would result in the loss of the operational use of the unit during a period when the need for units of all types is critical.

2. However in view of the fact that under current War Department policies, it appears that this unit would probably be nominated for redeployment, it is recommended that consideration be given to the possibility of including it as one of the thirty-seven (37) units of its type to be nominated as surplus to redeployment requirements.

3. It is believed that the action recommended in paragraphs 1 and 2 above would be of the best interests of the service.

FOR THE THEATER COMMANDER:

3 Incls - n/c

/s/ Richard P. Fisk
RICHARD P. FISK,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Assistant Adjutant General.

58 477

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NWD 730022
Authority
By SK HWA, Dab

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(Basic ltr, Hq Seventh Army, AG 333.5-C, sub: Inactivation of 827 TD Bn,
dtd 31 January 1945)

AG 333.5-1 GCT-AGM

6th Ind.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, APO 757, FORWARD
1 April 1945

TO: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, APO 887.

1. Attached hereto is a report of investigation of the 827 TD Battalion which is forwarded to your headquarters for review and recommended action.

2. It is requested that your recommendations reach this headquarters not later than 10 April 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ T. J. Davis
T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

3 Incls:
n/c

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NWD 730022
Authority
By SK HAW, Dala

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C O P Y

AG 322/3 C-0

5th Ind

LFG/st

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP, APO 23, 27 March 1945

TO: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Forward) APO 757

1. Forwarded herewith is a report of investigation of the 827th TD Bn.
2. This headquarters concurs in the recommendations of Commanding General, VI Corps, and Commanding General, Seventh Army, insofar as they relate to relief of the 827th TD Bn from combat.
3. This headquarters does not concur with recommendations of Commanding General, Seventh Army, for the inactivation or conversion of the 827th TD Bn to certain service units because the battalion is now being employed to meet an existing requirement on the Line of Communications. If this battalion were not employed for this purpose some other unit would have to be so employed.
4. Equipment of the 827th TD Bn in excess of that required for the performance of its currently assigned mission will be turned in to Seventh Army stocks.
5. In view of the above, recommend that the 827th TD Bn not be inactivated or converted to other type units at this time, in order that it can continue to be employed to meet existing requirements on the Line of Communications.

For the ARMY GROUP COMMANDER:

/s/ J. L. Tarr
J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

3 Incls.

n/c

(2 copy Incl. #3 w/d)

58, 479

- 4 -

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Authority
By SK HAW, Dab

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B/L AG 333.5-C Hq 7th Army 31 Jan 45 Re: Inactivation 827th TD Bn

AG 333

3rd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS, APO #46, U. S. Army, 11 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.

Additional testimony has been obtained and is attached as an added inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Michael L. Connors
MICHAEL L. CONNORS,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

3 Incls:

#3 added - Additional Testimony (4 copies)

AG 333.5-C

4th Ind.

JEP/ehs

(31 Jan 45)

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY, APO 758, U. S. Army, 16 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, 6th Army Group, APO 23, U. S. Army.

In accordance with instructions contained in 1st indorsement, additional testimony is attached.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ John E. Pederson
JOHN E. PEDERSON,
Major, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

3 Incls.

(1 cpy of Incl #3 w/d)

- 3 -

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Authority
By SK NAW, DAI

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C O P Y

AG 322/3 SGS-0

1st Ind.

TJB/rhh

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP, APO 23, 14 February 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758.

It is desired that additional testimony concerning the combat efficiency of the unit be taken from representative colored enlisted men, and that the complete file be returned to this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

/s/ J. L. Tarr
J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

2 Incls
n/c

B/L AG 333.5-C Hq 7th Army 31 Jan 45 Re: Inactivation of 827 TD Bn.

AG 333.5-A

2nd Ind.

HFP/ck

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY, A.P.O #758, U. S. Army, 1 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, VI Corps, A.P.O. #46, U.S. Army.

For additional testimony as directed in 1st Indorsement, review of such testimony, and any further recommendations that may be indicated.

By command of Lieutenant General PATCH:

/s/ Howard A. Spohr
HOWARD A. SPOHR,
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

2 Incls: n/c

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Authority
By SK NAW, DAB

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Ref No X-539

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
S E C R E T

Auth: CG 7 Army

Init:

Date: 31 Jan '45

.....
31 January 1945

AG 333.5 - C

SUBJECT: Inactivation of 827 TD Bn.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, APO 23, US Army.

1. In view of attached Report of Investigation, it is recommended that the 827 TD Battalion (SP) be inactivated, and that authority be granted this Headquarters to activate a Tank Destroyer battalion composed of white personnel.

2. a. If the above recommendation is approved, the following white service units are recommended for conversion to colored:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
3355 QM Trk Co	110
573 Med Amb Co	89
202 QM Car Co	129
69 Cheml Smoke Gen Co	133
78 Cheml Smoke Gen Co	133
Total	594

- b. If higher headquarters decides that a combat unit, white must be converted to colored, the 260th Engineer Bn (C), (aggregate strength 637), is recommended.

3. Request that necessary action be taken to obtain ETOUSA and War Department approval to the above plan.

/s/ A. M. Patch

A. M. PATCH,

Lieutenant General, US Army,
Commanding.

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
Report of Investigation
Letter of Transmittal

- 1 -

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
Office of the Inspector General
A.P.O. 46, U. S. Army

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Combat Inefficiency of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion (C).

TO : Commanding General, VI Corps, A.P.O. 46, U. S. Army.

I. AUTHORITY.

1. This investigation was conducted from 15 to 19 January 1945 by Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., Headquarters VI Corps in compliance with verbal orders of the Commanding General, VI Corps.

II. MATTER INVESTIGATED.

2. The combat efficiency of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the reasons for the refusal to man the destroyers.

III. FACTS.

3. a. Officers are rated average and above since entering active service. (Q. 15,17,39,102,105,110, 246, and Exhibit "B")

b. The officers do not have confidence in the colored personnel to the end that they have done much work that should have been accomplished with non-commissioned officers. (Q. 44,45,52,56,62,110,111, 128,218,219)

c. On 17 January 1945 the battalion had 27 officers (medical officer only, colored) and 2 warrant officers (C). Authorization: 35 officers and 2 warrant officers. (Q. 14)

4. Enlisted men.

a. The non-commissioned officers are weak, poorly disciplined and partially trained. (Q. 38,41,42,43,47,26,52,54,66,72,100,101, 102,105,106,108,109,135,136,137,151,155,222,223,227,247)

b. The AGCT scores indicate that the men of this battalion are far below the average of the army. (Q. 52,91,104,110)

c. The men are inadequately disciplined, poorly trained, and react very slowly. (Q. 5,10,37,44,100,111,106,129,134,155,180,191, 192,223,242)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority
by SL HAW, DAW

Sub A to Study

d. Four gun crews left or refused to man their destroyers in the face of the enemy. (Q. 124,137,147,148,150,211,212,220,223,263)

5. Combat efficiency is unsatisfactory. (Q. 91,93,94,146,163)

a. Unable to operate radio net. (Q. 40,56,68,127)

b. Unable to conduct indirect fire. (Q. 5,103,110,208)

IV. DISCUSSION.

6. Lt. Col. Phillip J. Vander Zwiep is, I believe, an average or above officer. He has had the experience of teaching tank destroyer school and impresses me as more suitable for the classroom than in command of a battalion in combat. He has been commander of this battalion since 5 August 1944, during which time the battalion prepared for its MTP test, packed up for overseas shipment, landed in Southern France, and drove overland to this area. Thus it is evident that he has not had an uninterrupted opportunity to train his battalion. He has personally, the feeling that the colored troops can not accomplish this work unless supervised directly and continuously by an officer. This feeling has resulted in officers doing non-commissioned officers' work and a lack of development of the non-commissioned officers. Thus the non-commissioned officers are incapable of performing their normal duties.

7. The officers are in general above average according to their efficiency ratings as shown in Exhibit "B". Each officer contacted stated at least once during the conversation that the colored soldier was slow and could not do the work required in that battalion efficiently. Therefore, officers had to directly supervise the men and in many cases do the work of the non-commissioned officers.


8. The enlisted men of this battalion have very low AGCT scores as indicated by Exhibit "B". I am unable to compare these figures with the average of colored troops, the nearest comparison being with the approximate figures of the army as a whole. This low mental ability results in slow coordination, slow reaction, slow action and inability of the majority to become proficient in the more technical duties such as operation of radio, driving M-18 vehicles, maintenance of materiel, and firing the gun on the M-18 destroyers. The training of this battalion has covered the period 20 April 1942, to date, which appears to be sufficient time to have a satisfactory unit if it can be made satisfactory. The change from towed (75mm), to self-propelled (M-10), to towed (3"), to self-propelled (M-18) has reduced their efficiency and increased their confusion. (Exhibit "C")

9. This battalion was with another corps a short time and one company was on the line but did not fire at any enemy targets. It was transferred to this area and at once placed in combat under conditions more severe than normal, with the results that three gun crews/refused to allegedly

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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Lt. A. L. Zwiep

C O N F I D E N T I A L

man the guns and were placed under arrest. The three destroyers are manned by the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion. One gun crew abandoned its destroyer when the building in which the destroyer was placed caught on fire. This crew, less the gun commander are under arrest. Other instances of abandoning guns were given that resulted in no disciplinary action. In the case of the platoon of destroyers in Hatten where the infantry reports good results from the tank destroyers, the platoon commander, Lt. Jones, stated that on two occasions he had to make them man the guns or remain on the guns at the point of a gun. This shows that they could man their guns under fire, but require unusual pressure from an officer and again showing the weaknesses of the non-commissioned officers.

10. This battalion joined this Corps with a certain division and was at once told to report to another division for assignment. This division commander told the commanding officer of the battalion to report to the Commanding General of Task Force WAHL. Upon reporting to Task Force WAHL, this battalion was attached to another tank destroyer battalion and assigned position areas at the front where an attack was in progress. The infantry commander in the area to which the battalion was assigned gave orders to the tank destroyer platoons or sections and Task Force WAHL gave orders to various platoons. Orders from different sources, inexperience of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion personnel, and stress of battle resulted in many misunderstandings on both sides. It is believed that this situation is improving and that each side understands the other more thoroughly.

11. The mission of the tank destroyer is given in FM 18-5, 18 July 1944, as the destruction of hostile tanks by direct gun fire. This mission has been accomplished in several cases. For instance, in the village of Hatten three enemy tanks were destroyed with nine rounds from the destroyers. The range was only eight or nine hundred yards. The same training manual gives several secondary missions, one or more of which require indirect fire. This battalion after two years and five months training was scheduled to receive instruction in indirect fire. This training was cancelled on 24 August 1944 by Fourth Army. It is not trained to accomplish this portion of its secondary mission.

12. It is a known fact that successful operation of a tank destroyer requires fast and accurate action especially in the initial stages of engagement. The enlisted personnel of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion have been slow to coordinate mind and muscle and also slow in complying with orders. From this inherent slowness it appears that the personnel of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion are not suitable for tank destroyer duty wherein a fraction of a second difference in firing the first round may mean the loss of our destroyer and crew or the destruction of an enemy tank.


13. Although Lt. Col. Vander Zwiep appears to be an average or above officer, he has not required his officers to make the non-commissioned

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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Sub A to Study

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

officers perform their duties. If there is an officer available who is as strong or stronger than Lt. Col. Vander Zwiep to take this battalion, it appears that faster progress will be made by a change of command. The executive does not appear to be the correct person to command under this situation. In case a stronger officer is not available to take command, then it will be best to leave Lt. Col. Vander Zwiep in command as a large percent of the enlisted trouble existed at the time he took command.

14. Training of the noncommissioned officers, training in radio procedure and training in indirect fire can best be accomplished in the rear area. This battalion should be withdrawn from the line. After intensive training of from one to four weeks, this battalion can be given another opportunity to demonstrate its ability to operate efficiently in battle.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

15. a. The combat inefficiency in the primary mission of this battalion and the lack of training in indirect fire unnecessarily endangers the lives of supported troops and materially weakens our defense.

b. That in general the non-commissioned officers are unable to perform their normal duties.

c. That the officers perform many duties normally performed by the non-commissioned officers.

d. That the coordination of these troops is very slow resulting in the loss of valuable time prior to the firing of the first round.

e. That this battalion should be withdrawn from the line; given intensive training; and recommitted at the front.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.

16. That the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion be withdrawn, given technical training and recommitted.

17. That Lt. Col. Vander Zwiep be replaced with a more forceful battalion commander.

18. Develop the non-commissioned officers by making each one perform his normal duty.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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By SK HWA, Dala

Int. A. Study

C O N F I D E N T I A L

19. That the trial of the men refusing to operate the guns be expedited.

20. That this report be forwarded through channels to War Department, Washington, 25, D.C.

N. L. Adams
N. L. ADAMS,
Colonel, I.G.D.,
Inspector General.

3 Incls
Exhibits "A", "B", and "C".

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS, APO 46, U. S. Army, 26 January 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U. S. Army.

1. The investigation is approved in substance.
2. Recommendations are as follows:
 - a. Withdraw 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion from combat.
 - b. Disband the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion as a combat unit and distribute the enlisted personnel to appropriate existing service units, except those soldiers who have proven themselves to be worthy, who should be reassigned to appropriate combat units.
 - c. Reassign officer personnel to existing Tank Destroyer Battalions.

Edward H. Brooks
EDWARD H. BROOKS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls: n/c

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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Let A to Study

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Authority
By SK HAWA, Data

EFFICIENCY RATING OF OFFICERS BY RANK OF 827TH TD BATTALION


<u>No of Off</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Sup</u>	<u>Ex</u>	<u>VS</u>	<u>Sat</u>	<u>U</u>
2	Major	10 Mos	38 Mos	5 Mos		
8	Capt	61 Mos	147 Mos	19 Mos		2 Mos
12	1st Lt	45 Mos	164 Mos	53 Mos	10 Mos	
12	2d Lt	22 Mos	99 Mos	57 Mos	1 Mo	
1	C.W.O.	3 Mos	15 Mos	10 Mos		
1	W.O.J.G	5 Mos	2 Mos			

ENLISTED ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST RATINGS OF
827TH TD BATTALION COMPARED WITH AVERAGE OF THE ARMY

<u>Class</u>	<u>Average of the Army</u>	<u>2 Oct 43</u>	<u>19 Jan 45</u>
I	7 %	.15 %	.7 %
II	25 %	4.87 %	5.1 %
III	37.5 %	12.4 %	16.2 %
IV	21.5 %	44.43 %	41.3 %
V	8 %	38.15 %	36.5 %

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EXHIBIT "B"



Sub A to Study

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
Office of the Inspector General
A.P.O. 46, U. S. Army

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Combat Inefficiency of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion (C).

TO : Commanding General, VI Corps, A.P.O. 46, U. S. Army.

1. In accordance with the directives contained in 1st Indorsement, Headquarters Sixth Army Group, dated 14 February 1945, and 2d Indorsement, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 1 March 1945, additional testimony was obtained from enlisted men of the Battalion. The men were selected by asking the Company Commanders for two or three men performing duties of platoon sergeant, gun commander, gunner, driver, radio man or other member of the section.

2. Lt. Col. Phillip J. Vander Zweip, Battalion Commander, furnished the additional information contained in Exhibit "B" concerning the conduct of some enlisted men since about mid January 1945. This evidence is added as it has a definite bearing on the combat efficiency of the 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

3. Of the twelve men questioned, Staff Sergeant John H. Hanson was the only person who gave the impression that he would prefer to return to the front rather than remain on guard duty. The other eleven men hesitated sufficiently long to indicate that they did not desire to return to the front or openly stated that they did not desire additional combat duty.

4. The answers to some of my questions were very accurate and others were very inaccurate. The noncommissioned officers, especially Sergeant Gaskin, "B" Company, did not know their duties sufficiently well to instruct others in an efficient manner.

5. Conclusions:


a. The enlisted men interviewed under rear area conditions indicated a satisfactory rating.

b. An examination conducted under non-combat conditions does not accurately indicate the combat efficiency of an organization.

6. It is recommended that the enlisted personnel of the 827th Tank destroyer Battalion be transferred to a colored infantry division.

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N. L. Adams
N. L. ADAMS,
Colonel, I.G.D.,
Inspector General.



I N D E X

WITNESSES


-EXHIBIT "A"-

<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>		<u>Page</u>
S/Sgt Leo C. Jennings	Recon Co, 827th TD Bn	Testimony	59 - 60
Cpl Guy Johnson Eaton	Recon Co, 827th TD Bn	Testimony	61 - 63
Cpl James Brown	Recon Co, 827th TD Bn	Testimony	64 - 66
S/Sgt John H. Hanson	Co "A", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	67 - 70
Sgt Lewis Dunn	Co "A", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	71 - 73
Cpl Milton Alexander Johnson	Co "C", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	74 - 75
Tec 4 Allen Gresham	Co "C", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	76 - 77
Tec 4 Paul L. Edwards	Co "A", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	78 - 80
PFC Robert Barron	Co "A", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	81 - 82
Sgt Nathaniel Gaskins	Co "B", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	83 - 85
Cpl Windsor Albert Freeman	Co "B", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	86 - 87
PFC Willy Adams	Co "B", 827th TD Bn	Testimony	88 - 89

Statement of Lt. Col. Phillip J. Vander Zweip, Bn Cmdr, 827th TD Bn. . . . EXHIBIT "B"

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



SGT LEO C JENNINGS, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at MERVILLER, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Leo C. Jennings, Sgt, 34069291, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

268. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

269. Q. How long have you been in Reconnaissance Company?

A. Two years and six months, Sir.

270. Q. Have you trained with any weapon other than your rifle or carbine?

A. Yes Sir, the 50 Caliber MG.

271. Q. Did you ever fire the 50 Caliber MG?

A. Yes Sir.

272. Q. What type of 50 Caliber MG did you have?

A. I had a Browning 50 Caliber MG, heavy barrel.

273. Q. What is the rate of fire per minute of the 50 Caliber MG?

A. 300 to 500 rounds per minute.

274. Q. What is considered effective range with the 50 Caliber MG?

A. Around 3,500 yards is the best I can remember.

275. Q. Did you receive any instruction in map reading?

A. Very little, Sir.

276. Q. Can you read a map?

A. I can read it very good.

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EXHIBIT "A"

JENNINGS

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277. Q. This is a 1:25,000 map (pointing to map), what do these lines that form squares indicate?

A. Those are grid lines.

278. Q. What do we mean by coordinates?

A. I do not know.

279. Q. What does this green on this map indicate?

A. Vegetation, Sir.

280. Q. What does this line represent (indicating a stream line)?

A. A stream, Sir.

281. Q. What does this red and white line represent?

A. The red and white lines are unimproved roads.

282. Q. What do these two narrow parellel lines indicate?

A. A highway, Sir.

283. Q. What were your duties when this Battalion was at the front?

A. I was guarding the CP.

284. Q. How far from the front were you?

A. They told us at one time that it was three miles, Sir.

CPL GUY JOHNSON EATON, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at MERVILLER, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Guy Johnson Eaton, Cpl, 34251436, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

285. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

286. Q. How long have you been in this Reconnaissance Company?

A. Since 10 June 1942.

287. Q. What were your duties in the Reconnaissance Company?

A. When I was on the line I was a radio operator.

288. Q. What type of radio did you operate?

A. A 608 radio.

289. Q. Will the 608 radio send and receive messages?

A. Yes Sir.

290. Q. How far can you send messages?

A. I was told it was 15 miles, Sir.

291. Q. How far can you receive messages?

A. 15 miles.

292. Q. What code did you use in sending messages?

A. I used the prearranged code in sending messages.

293. Q. How fast can you send a message?

A. It all depends on how long it is.

294. Q. How many code words per minute can you send?

A. I never have tested that Sir.


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295. Q. How fast can you receive messages?
- A. I can receive 10 code words per minute, Sir.
296. Q. In sending a message by 608, can you send that by voice?
- A. Yes Sir.
297. Q. Can you send it like you were sending a telegraph message over a line?
- A. No Sir.
298. Q. I give you a message to send to the Commanding Officer, Company "A". Here is the message, "Move your destroyer one mile north of your present position". How do you send that message?
- A. I would not send it in the clear, I would give it to the code and panel corporal to have it decoded.
299. Q. In what form would the message be when the code and panel corporal gave it back to you in code form?
- A. It would be either in a prearranged form or a two-letter group.
300. Q. What do you mean by prearranged form?
- A. Prearranged means changing around the code letters.
301. Q. Two of these letters are "CA", how will you send "CA" to the operator of Company "A"?
- A. I would send it "Charlie Able".
302. Q. Then you will send it by voice?
- A. Yes Sir.
303. Q. Did you ever hear of the dot-dash telegraph system?
- A. I am not well acquainted with it, Sir.
304. Q. Did you ever try to use the dot-dash telegraph system?
- A. No Sir.
305. Q. Were you ever instructed in the use of the dot-dash telegraph system?
- A. No Sir.

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EXHIBIT "A"



EATON

306. Q. Did you ever have any instruction in map reading?

A. A little Sir.

307. Q. I tell you to take your radio to the point whose coordinates are 25-26. Show me on this map where you would go?

A. Correct.

308. Q. What does this green on the map indicate?

A. Water, Sir.

309. Q. What does this blue represent?

A. The blue is a running stream and the green is a marsh.

310. Q. What do two parallel dotted lines represent?

A. I would look at the key to determine what that is, but I think it is an unimproved road.

311. Q. What kind of a weapon do you carry?

A. A carbine, Sir.

312. Q. How far is effective range with the carbine?

A. 300 yards with the sight we have.

313. Q. What size bullet does the carbine shoot?

A. 30 caliber, Sir.

314. Q. What do you mean by 30 caliber?

A. The size of the cartridge, Sir.

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EXHIBIT "A"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority	NWD 730022
By	SK HAWA, DAD

CPL JAMES BROWN, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at MERVILLER, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. James Brown, Cpl, 34166660, Reconnaissance Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

315. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

316. Q. How long have you been in Reconnaissance Company?

A. It will be three years 23 April 1945.

317. Q. What are your combat duties?

A. When I was on the line I was a CP guard.

318. Q. What were you trained to do before you went on the line?

A. Pioneer work, Sir.

319. Q. Name some of the things you were trained to do?

A. Building bridges and blowing craters.

320. Q. How do you blow a crater in a road?

A. By boring a hole in the ground, placing a charge with a fuse, and covering the charge with dirt.

321. Q. How would you blow a crater in a concrete road?

A. By drilling a hole in concrete and placing a charge in the hole.

322. Q. What kind of a charge would you place in the hole?

A. I would place TNT or dynamite in the whole.

323. Q. What type of bridges were you trained to build?

A. Small bridges such as the pontoon bridge.

324. Q. What is a pontoon bridge?

A. It is a bridge that you put up in a short time to let troops pass over.

325. Q. What would that bridge be made of?

A. Poles, bolts, or anything handy.

326. Q. How long a bridge can you make that way?

A. About 30 feet, I imagine.

327. Q. How would you hold up those bolts in the center?

A. If the water wasn't too deep I would put a bent on it.

328. Q. What is a bent?

A. A bent is part of the bridge, running at the same angle as the floor.

329. Q. In a reconnaissance platoon are you supposed to be able to go out and get information about the enemy?

A. Yes Sir.

330. Q. We are in this little town (pointing on the map) and about two kilometers is another town. I want you to take two men and go to this second town and get information of the enemy. What will you do?

A. I would tell the two men what we were supposed to do and that they were going there. I would tell them how long it would take to get there and that we didn't want to be seen by the enemy after we got there, and after I found out how many enemy there were I would return.

331. Q. Would you take a car or walk?

A. It would be better to walk.

332. Q. How would you determine the number of men in that town?

A. You can look at the amount of equipment he has and if they have right-smart equipment there, they have a good deal of men.

333. Q. What type of equipment would you expect to see?

A. Antitank guns, foot troops, and other equipment.

334. Q. If an enemy MG started firing at you, what would you do?

A. I would take cover.

335. Q. In crossing this field from where we are (pointing to map) to the village where the enemy is, how would you take cover?
- A. I would send one man down beside the railroad and send the other across the stream above the bank of the stream.
336. Q. What type of small arms do you carry?
- A. I carry a carbine.
337. Q. What is the effective range of the carbine?
- A. 300 yards, Sir.
338. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of the carbine?
- A. 2,600 feet per second.
339. Q. How fast can you fire the carbine accurately?
- A. I can fire it at about 10 shots per second.
340. Q. Have you received any instruction in first aid?
- A. Just a little, Sir.
341. Q. How do you tell the difference between a vein or artery that has been cut?
- A. The vein will spurt blood and the artery is a steady flow of blood.
342. Q. An artery in my leg is cut, what is the best thing to do for it?
- A. I would lay you down and put a tourniquet on it, Sir.
343. Q. Where would you put the tourniquet?
- A. Above the wound, Sir.
344. Q. A vein is cut six inches above the knee, where would you put the tourniquet?
- A. I would put the tourniquet above the wound.
345. Q. What was the nearest to the actual front that you were?
- A. About nine or ten miles, Sir.
346. Q. Did you want to go any nearer to the front line?
- A. No Sir, that was close enough and my platoon wasn't assigned any further.

S/SGT JOHN H. HANSON, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. John H. Hanson, S/Sgt, 34166684, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

347. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

348. Q. How long have you been with "A" Company?

A. Since 20 April 1942.

349. Q. What were your duties during January 1945 when Company "A" was at the front?

A. In January 1945 I was platoon sergeant while at the front.

350. Q. As platoon sergeant what did you do?

A. I received orders from the platoon commander and passed the orders on to the men. If the lieutenant was present and would take one section, I would take the other section. We fired more as tanks than as tank destroyers.

351. Q. Where was your platoon while at the front?

A. My platoon was at RITTERSHOFFEN, FRANCE while at the front.

352. Q. While at RITTERSHOFFEN, how far from the front were you?

A. At that particular time I was told that the enemy was in HATTEN.

353. Q. As platoon sergeant were you required to train the gun sections in your platoon?

A. Yes Sir.

354. Q. Just what did you do towards training your gun sections before going into combat?

A. In the states I told my men if they could accomplish their mission by being in an open space to get into the open space in order to accomplish it or get into concealment if they have to accomplish it that way.

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EXHIBIT "A"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HANSON

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355. Q. What kind of a mission were you given at the front near RITTERSHOFFEN?
A. We were told to go to RITTERSHOFFEN and destroy the enemy.
356. Q. How did you destroy the enemy?
A. We were unable to contact the enemy.
357. Q. Why were you unable to contact the enemy?
A. In the position we were in the enemy did not make a drive through that particular sector.
358. Q. Did your platoon do any fighting at all in RITTERSHOFFEN?
A. No Sir.
359. Q. Did the men in the gun crews willingly man their guns?
A. Yes Sir.
360. Q. Did you have any trouble to get them to man their guns?
A. There was no trouble the whole time I was there.
361. Q. What is your feeling towards duty at the front?
A. That question is difficult for me to answer. We have a war to win and if necessary I am willing to go back to the front to help win the war.
362. Q. How many men of your platoon are willing to return to the front with you?
A. All of my platoon would go back.
363. Q. Which platoon do you have?
A. Second Platoon, "A" Company.
364. Q. Did you do any instructing yourself while in the States?
A. A little, Sir.
365. Q. What did you instruct in?
A. Sight picture on the gun and operation of the vehicle, itself.

366. Q. Tell me just how you instructed your men on the sight?

A. I would get me a sight and a small piece of wood and get by a tree that I could put the block up on. I would have two men to hold the sight and get a little block on the ground with a string, then I would take a stick and let one man pull this little block across the terrain so all men could see it. I would have two men put the sight on the range and lead that I would give them. Then at the same time, with this stick pulling this block across, I would have a fire mission and send some shots.

367. Q. How did you determine the lead?

A. The leads are on the sight. Put the block on the tree and if the tank is going from right to left you have your lead ahead of the tank.

368. Q. With a moving enemy tank in a field, how would you determine the lead to use?

A. If the tank is a 1,000 yards away and moving approximately ten miles per hour, you would use up to a lead and one-half from the sight.

369. Q. How do you estimate range?

A. With a field glass or naked eye in which case I would estimate from 100 to 200 yards, but if the ground is hilly I could not do it this way.

370. Q. How would you determine the range of an enemy tank on hilly ground?

A. I would have to see the tank to estimate the range.

371. Q. What is indirect fire?

A. Firing at a target that you can't see.

372. Q. What data do you need to prepare the guns for indirect firing?

A. Take an aiming circle and any stationary point. The point must remain still and place the coordinates on the sight.

373. Q. Have you had any instruction in map reading?

A. A little, Sir.

374. Q. What is a contour?

A. A line showing a section above sea level.

375. Q. What is a grid line?

A. A line that you get coordinates from.

376. Q. What are coordinates?

A. A coordinate is a number that you can find a place on the map.

377. Q. What does this green on the map indicate?

A. A wooded area.

378. Q. What does this red line on the map indicate?

A. It indicates roads.

379. Q. What are these brown lines?

A. Those brown lines show hilly ground.

380. Q. What does this line on the map with short lines crossing it indicate?

A. It is a place that has been washed out.

SGT LEWIS DUNN, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Lewis Dunn, Sgt, 33171122, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

381. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

382. Q. How long have you been in Company "A"?

A. Since August 1942.

383. Q. What were your duties last January when you were at the front?

A. I was gun commander, Sir.

384. Q. As gun commander at the front, what did you do?

A. I would place my destroyer in position and if the target appeared and I was told to fire, I would fire at it.

385. Q. Did you fire at any enemy tanks?

A. I was told one day by a Lt Colonel to fire on a tank which they thought was a German tank, but only after investigation it was one of our Sherman tanks painted white in the woods.

386. Q. Did you fire on this tank?

A. Two rounds were fired on this tank.

387. Q. After firing two rounds what did you do?

A. I was told to stop firing by the Lt Colonel.

388. Q. Did you hit the tank?

A. No Sir.

389. Q. Where did this take place?

A. In RITTERSHOFFEN, FRANCE.

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EXHIBIT "A"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DUNN

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Authority	
By	SL HAWA, DAB

390. Q. What were your orders about manning your destroyer?

A. When we first went into this town we went in at night about 0100 hours and were told to keep two men on the gun at all times.

391. Q. Did you keep two men on the gun at all times?

A. Yes Sir, 24 hours a day.

392. Q. In drill what does the loader do at the command "load"?

A. The loader loads on the command "load" and he can either touch the gunner or the gunner can hear the breechblock go up.

393. Q. What causes the breechblock to go up?

A. When the rim of the shell hits the two extractors.

394. Q. What is the rate of fire of your gun in your destroyer?

A. Different guns have different rates.

395. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of your gun?

A. It depends on the type shell we fire.

396. Q. What type shell do you fire?

A. APC and HE.

397. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of the HE?

A. 2,800 feet per second.

398. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of the APC?

A. 2,600 feet per second.

399. Q. Where is the bursting charge?

A. I don't know.

400. Q. Where is the propelling charge?

A. It is in front of the shell.

401. Q. What is a fuze?

A. It sets the shell off.

402. Q. What is a primer used for?

A. To detonate the shell.

403. Q. Have you had instruction in map reading?

A. Yes Sir, I have.

404. Q. Show me on this map a wooded area?

A. He showed me correctly.

405. Q. Show me an improved road?

A. Incorrect.

406. Q. Show me a river?

A. Correct.

407. Q. Show me a trail?

A. Incorrect.

408. Q. Your Company Commander tells you to take your tank destroyer to a point on this map represented by coordinates 240-265. Where will you take this tank?

A. That is correct.

409. Q. How did you feel when you were on duty at the front in RITTERSHOFFEN?

A. It is pretty hard to explain, at least I wasn't scared. I was just out there waiting.

410. Q. Do you desire to return to the front for duty?

A. If they say we have to go back then I am willing to go.

CPL MILTON ALEXANDER JOHNSON, Company "C", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Milton Alexander Johnson, Cpl, 33170876, Company "C", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

411. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

412. Q. How long have you been in Company "C"?

A. Since June 1942.

413. Q. Where was Company "C" last January when you were at the front?

A. To the left of RITTERSHOFFEN at ASCHBACH.

414. Q. While in that position did you see any enemy tanks?

A. I didn't see any moving enemy tanks.

415. Q. What were your duties while at the front?

A. I was gunner.

416. Q. What does a gunner do while a destroyer is firing at an enemy tank?

A. He takes orders from the gun commander.

417. Q. How long were you in that position?

A. About 17 days.

418. Q. What is the range of your gun?

A. 1,700 yards.

419. Q. How did you feel while in that position?

A. I didn't feel scared.

420. Q. Are you willing to return to the front for further duty?


A. Speaking for myself, I am, provided I can be in a tank destroyer or tank outfit.

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EXHIBIT "A"

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JOHNSON



421. Q. Why do you say "provided I can be in a tank destroyer or tank outfit?"
- A. It is the only branch of service that I am crazy about.
422. Q. Would you be willing to go to the front as an infantryman?
- A. No Sir, I just don't like the infantry.
423. Q. Would you be willing to return to the front as field artillery?
- A. No Sir, I like to shoot the big guns.
424. Q. How do you orient your gun?
- A. I put a cross hair on the muzzle of the tube, then point the gun at a distant object about 1,500 yards or more, and then direct my sight on that same object. My gun is now adjusted.
425. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of HE shells?
- A. 2,800 feet per second.
426. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of APC shells?
- A. 2,700 feet per second.
427. Q. What kind of small arms do you carry?
- A. A carbine.
428. Q. What is the muzzle velocity of your carbine?
- A. 1,500 feet per second.
429. Q. Show me water on this map?
- A. Correct.
430. Q. Show me woods on this map?
- A. Correct.
431. Q. Show me an improved road?
- A. Correct.
432. Q. Your platoon sergeant tells you to take your destroyer to a point whose coordinates are 230-265, where will you take your destroyer?
- A. He pointed correctly on the map.

TEC 4 ALLEN GRESHAM, Company "C", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Allen Gresham, Tec 4, 34066076, Company "C", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

433. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

434. Q. How long have you been in Company "C"?

A. Two years.

435. Q. During January 1945 when your Company was at the front, what were your duties?

A. At that time I was an M-18 driver.

436. Q. Where was your destroyer at the front?

A. At a farmhouse in RITTERSHOFFEN.

437. Q. While in that position did you see any enemy tanks?

A. No Sir.

438. Q. Did you shoot at any enemy tanks?

A. I fired a Mark-4 tank after we moved our tank from the farmhouse to a position near a pillbox.

439. Q. Did you hit the tank?

A. Yes Sir.

440. Q. Then what did you do?

A. I backed up and took a dug-in position.

441. Q. Did your gun commander have any trouble keeping his men in the destroyer?

A. No Sir.

442. Q. Who was your gun commander?

A. Sgt Melvin B. Witt.

443. Q. Do you desire to return to the front for further duty?

A. If I still stay with the same crew.

444. Q. Why do you say "the same crew"?

A. I am acquainted with their ways and they are acquainted with mine.

445. Q. Would the rest of the crew like to return to the front?

A. I don't know, because we are sort of split up.

446. Q. What subjects have you been instructed in?

A. First aid and map reading.

447. Q. What is a compound fracture?

A. The bone is cracked up on the inside.

448. Q. What is a simple fracture?

A. Just when the bone is cracked.

449. Q. How would you tell the difference between an artery and a vein that had been cut?

A. A vein runs and an artery jumps.

450. Q. An artery in my leg is cut six inches above the knee, what will you do for it?

A. I would tie a belt above the wound, and tighten it.

451. Q. Show me on this map a river?

A. Correct.

452. Q. Show me on this map a forest?

A. Correct.

453. Q. Show me an improved road?

A. Correct.

454. Q. Show me a railroad?

A. Correct.

TEC 4 PAUL L. EDWARDS, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Paul L. Edwards, Tec 4, 32234263, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

455. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

456. Q. How long have you been in "A" Company?

A. About two years and six months, Sir.

457. Q. During January 1945 when you were at the front, what were your duties?

A. I was radio operator for Company "A".

458. Q. Did you remain in company headquarters or were you in a tank?

A. I was in company headquarters.

459. Q. Where was Company "A" Headquarters?

A. In RITTERSHOFFEN.

460. Q. What type of radio did you operate?

A. I operated a 608, Sir.

461. Q. What is the effective distance a 608 radio can send and receive?

A. Some 7½ to 15 miles.

462. Q. At what speed can you send messages?

A. The 608 is a voice radio.

463. Q. How can you send a message in code with a 608?

A. You can send a message by prearranged code or by runner if the radio is out.

464. Q. What do you mean by prearranged code?
- A. When you are transmitting messages over the air. If they are secret you have to send them in a prearranged code or by cipher device.
465. Q. You receive a message in code containing five code words, how long will it take you to decode that message?
- A. The code that we used didn't have a five-letter code. We used a two-letter code group.
466. Q. You receive five groups of two letter each, how long will it take you to decode that message?
- A. It would take me about three minutes, Sir.
467. Q. You have never been instructed in the use of the larger lettered code groups?
- A. Yes Sir.
468. Q. Why didn't you use five-letter groups in your battalion?
- A. The particular SOI we had did not require the five-letter code group.
469. Q. How fast can you send by key?
- A. I can send about 12 words per minute.
470. Q. How fast can you receive with a key message?
- A. I can receive about 10 words per minute.
471. Q. An amplitude modulator is not required in a line company of a TD Battalion, is that true?
- A. Yes Sir.
472. Q. What else have you received instruction in?
- A. I have received instruction in radio procedure, transmission security, and preventive maintenance of the set.
473. Q. What is security?
- A. Security, Sir, is when you are in enemy territory and by playing with the button it sends out a signal and it is able to be picked up by the enemy.

474. Q. What harm would it do for the enemy to pick up a radio signal that you had sent out?
- A. The enemy could locate your position, because they have two direction finders. Each direction finder has a range antenna which covers 360 degrees and where the two lines intersect is your position.
475. Q. Have you had any instruction in map reading or first aid?
- A. Yes Sir.
476. Q. What is a compound fracture?
- A. A bone that has been broken in two places.
477. Q. How do you tell the difference between an injured vein and an artery?
- A. One spurts blood and the other just oozes.
478. Q. How long should you leave a tourniquet on a wound?
- A. About 15 minutes and then release the tourniquet.
479. Q. Why do you loosen it?
- A. If you kept it tight all the time you wouldn't give the blood a chance to flow.
480. Q. Indicate woods on that map?
- A. Correct.
481. Q. Indicate water on that map?
- A. Correct.
482. Q. Indicate a railroad?
- A. Correct.
483. Q. Indicate an improved road?
- A. Incorrect.

PFC ROBERT BARRON, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 8 March 1945, at BACCARAT, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Robert Barron, Pfc, 35744598, Company "A", 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

484. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes Sir.

485. Q. How long have you been in Company "A"?

A. Since December 1942.

486. Q. In January 1945 when your battalion was at the front, what were your duties?

A. Assistant gunner, Sir.

487. Q. What are some of the duties of the assistant gunner?

A. He loads the guns, helps check ammunition, and if the gunner is killed the assistant gunner is supposed to take his place and keep on firing.

488. Q. Where was your destroyer during January 1945?

A. I didn't know.

489. Q. Did you shoot at any enemy tanks?

A. No Sir.

490. Q. Did you shoot your gun at any time while at the front?

A. No Sir.

491. Q. Why not?

A. We were holding positions for the infantry, and watching for the Shermans.

492. Q. Did you see any enemy tanks while at the front?

A. Only ones that had been knocked out.

493. Q. Do you desire to return to the front for further duty?
- A. My nerves are pretty bad, but if I had to go back to the front I would go back.
494. Q. What is the trouble with your nerves?
- A. When a gun cracks I get nervous.
495. Q. How long have you been that way?
- A. My nerves have always been weak since a kid.
496. Q. What do you do when a gun goes off?
- A. I get half-way scared.
497. Q. Did any German artillery or tank shoot at you?
- A. Yes Sir, when we were at RITTERSHOFFEN, they fired on us.
498. Q. What did you do when they fired on us?
- A. We were in the cellar.
499. Q. Did the entire gun crew go into the cellar?
- A. There were two men always on the guns.
500. Q. How fast can you fire a gun in the destroyer?
- A. I can fire one round and in another minute have another round in.
501. Q. Show me a woods on that map?
- A. Incorrect.
502. Q. Show me a river on that map?
- A. Correct.
503. Q. Show me a railroad?
- A. Incorrect.
504. Q. What is a compound fracture?
- A. When the bone is sticking out through the meat.
505. Q. How can you tell the difference between a injured vein and an artery?
- A. The artery spurts and the vein just bleeds.

SGT NATHANIEL GASKINS, 34067235, B Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 10 March 1945, at CIREY, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Nathaniel Gaskins, Sgt, 34067235, B Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

506. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes sir.

507. Q. What were you doing while at the front during January?

A. I was a gun commander of a tank destroyer at HATTEN or vicinity.

508. Q. While in HATTEN did you see any German tanks?

A. Yes sir, I did.

509. Q. What did you do when you saw the German tanks in HATTEN?

A. We opened fire on them when we got the order to.

510. Q. Did you knock any German tanks out?

A. We crippled one or two sir. We knocked a wheel off one and an armored car too.

511. Q. Did you have any trouble keeping your destroyer crew on the tanks?

A. They were nervous in battle. We all were.

512. Q. What did they do when they were nervous?

A. We all were confused at the particular time in HATTEN. We did not know what to do because we were surrounded. After the platoon sergeant came over and told us what to do we got along pretty fair.

513. Q. What work are you on now?

A. I am on guard duty.

514. Q. Which would you prefer: go back to the front with a destroyer, or remain here on guard?

A. Personally, I would prefer going back to the front.

58 515. Q. Which officer were you under at HATTEN?

A. Lt. Jones.

516. Q. Did Lt. Jones have any trouble with your section in keeping them on the destroyer?

A. At one time during that morning I gave an order to dismount the destroyer as it was hit. Lt. Jones did not know it was hit and he asked us why we dismounted the destroyer. He said we would get shot that way. After that he looked and found the destroyer was hit. I went back later and took the ammunition and food out and put it in another destroyer.

517. Q. Then did your destroyer crew man another destroyer?

A. Yes, we took turns in relieving one another. Something like a rotating system.

518. Q. Why do you think Lt. Jones said you will get shot when you directed the crew off the destroyer?

A. I think, he did not explain it further, that we were dismounting for general purposes.

519. Q. Tell me please, what command you give when the platoon commander indicates a German tank to your destroyer?

A. I give the direction; right front, shell ATC, line front, tank 800 yards. After command 800 yards, fire is automatic. I give him lead on stationary target, and give him a zero-lead if it is a moving target.

520. Q. How do you figure lead with a moving target?

A. I get it through the mill, through a glass; speed of the tank. I estimate the speed it is moving and get the lead on it.

521. Q. How do you get the speed of a moving target?

A. Estimate it by my training. How fast would a vehicle move if moving at two miles per hour, which is 15 or 20. Work all the time through estimation, or so I was taught.

522. Q. What is the normal rate of fire of a destroyer?

A. About five rounds per minute.

523. Q. What type of small arms do you have now?

A. An M1.

524. Q. What is the effective range of an M1?

A. 600 yards.

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525. Q. Referring to map: Show me a woods on this map.
A. Incorrect.
526. Q. Show me a river.
A. Incorrect.
527. Q. You are told to take your destroyer to a point whose coordinates are 220255. Show me where you will take your tank.
A. Incorrect.
528. Q. Regarding first aid: What is a compound fracture?
A. It is when the bone is protruding through the skin.
529. Q. How do you tell the difference between blood flowing from an artery and a vein?
A. Blood coming from the vein, it flows or runs. Blood coming from the artery, it oozes out.
530. Q. What is the difference between flowing and oozing?
A. Flowing is a continuous stream. Oozing is when it is barely coming out.

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EXHIBIT "A"

CONFIDENTIAL

GASKINS

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SB HAW, Dala

CPL. WINDSOR ALBERT FREEMAN, ASN 12183775, B Company, 827th TD Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 10 March 1945, at CIREY, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Windsor Albert Freeman, Cpl, 12183775, B Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

531. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes sir.

532. Q. Cpl Freeman, what duty were you on early in January when you were out on the front.

A. Gunner on a destroyer on an M-18 at HATTEN.

533. Q. Did you, while in HATTEN, see a German tank?

A. Yes sir.

534. Q. Did your destroyer knock out a German tank?

A. No sir, not mine.

535. Q. What did you do when you saw a German tank?

A. When I saw a German tank I was not in my destroyer. S/Sgt Johnson and I were in a knocked out M-10. When we saw the tank we opened fire on it sir.

536. Q. How many of your gun crew were with you when you saw the German tank?

A. They were all there, but just myself and Sgt. Johnson were on the M-10 and they were on other destroyers and where they were they could not fire on the tank.

537. Q. What were you doing in an M-10?

A. Loading the gun for Sgt. Johnson.

538. Q. Did you say you were M-18?

A. Yes sir.

539. Q. Why were you not on an M-18?


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EXHIBIT "A"

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FREEMAN




- A. The position of my M-18 was in the rear and could not fire on tank. Tank was coming down stream. I ran over stream to help Johnson load gun.
540. Q. What duty are you performing now?
- A. Guard duty.
541. Q. Which would you prefer: returning to the front in a destroyer or remaining here on guard?
- A. That is according. Returning to the front on a destroyer, if sent up with an outfit like the 79th. I would not mind. An outfit that would stick with you.
542. Q. Regarding map: Show me woods on that map.
- A. Correct.
543. Q. Show me a river on that map.
- A. Correct.
544. Q. Show me an improved road.
- A. Incorrect.
545. Q. You are told to take your destroyer to a point at coordinates 230251. Where would you take it?
- A. Incorrect.

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EXHIBIT "A"

FREEMAN



PFC WILLY ADAMS, ASN 34273700, B Company, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, appeared before the Inspector, Colonel N. L. Adams, I.G.D., on 10 March 1945, at CIREY, FRANCE, was duly sworn as a witness and testified as follows:

Q. Please state your full name, rank, serial number, and organization.

A. Willy Adams, PFC, 34273700, B Company, 827th TD Battalion.

The rights of a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30, were read and explained.

546. Q. Are your rights as a witness under provisions of the 24th Article of War, and paragraphs 4 and 7, AR 20-30 clear to you?

A. Yes sir.

547. Q. Adams, what duty were you on when you were at the front in early January?

A. I was assistant loader on an M-18.

548. Q. What village or town were you in?

A. We were cut off in the town of HATTEN for three or four days.

549. Q. Did you see any German tanks while you were in HATTEN?

A. Yes sir.

550. Q. What did you do when you saw German tanks?

A. We fired on it sir.

551. Q. Did everybody on your tank stay on the tank and fire when you saw German tanks?

A. Some did not stay on there.

552. Q. Why didn't they?

A. They were excited.

553. Q. Why did you get excited?

A. I was taken right out of a kitchen and so got excited in an attack but I stayed and did the best I could.

554. Q. Where did the other men go who did get excited?

A. They ran into buildings and Lt. Jones had to make them get back into the destroyer.

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555. Q. Did that happen very often?

A. No, that did not happen very often. They got back.

556. Q. Would you like to get back to the front on a destroyer?

A. No sir. I will do what I am told. If they put me in them, I will go in them.

557. Q. Would you rather go back to the front in a destroyer or stay here on the work you are now doing?

A. I would rather do the work I am now doing.

558. Q. How long have you been in Company B?

A. About three years.

559. Q. What training outside of tanks have you received?

A. Not anything. I have been working around the kitchen most of the time.

560. Q. Speaking of first aid: What is a compound fracture?

A. It is a broken bone that comes through the skin.

561. Q. Referring to map: Show me woods on this map.

A. Correct.

562. Q. Show me a river on the map.

A. Incorrect.

563. Q. Show me a first class highway.

A. Incorrect.

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EXHIBIT "A"

CONFIDENTIAL

ADAMS

DECLASSIFIED
NWD 730022
Authority
By SL R/W, DAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

8 March 1945

The following evidence was submitted by Lieutenant Colonel PHILLIP J. VANDER ZWEIP, Battalion Commander, 827th Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 8 March 1945:

These offenses have been committed by the personnel of this battalion since mid January 1945.

- a. Three men are awaiting trial for rape.
- b. One man shot a Frenchman and is awaiting trial.
- c. One man is awaiting trial for using insulting language before the Battalion Commander.
- d. I have been advised to sleep in a room with another officer.

58 522

EXHIBIT "B"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VANDER ZWEIP

